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Thinking Love and Mortality with Heidegger

Derrida writes in the midst of a temporality whose traces appear on the body of his dying mother, and he does so while at the same time evoking the *interior intimo meo* of an Augustine who, with his mother, believed he touched the eternal (where his love will never lose her). Through such writing, Derrida can be read, just as much as Augustine, to understand the self as constituted and sustained by an interweaving of innermost and outermost. Derrida translates the *interior intimo meo*, however, into the register of a living-together that is always already also a dying together. Thanks to its mortal condition, the interplay between anticipation and memory within such living will never achieve the consummation, fullness, or closure whose logic (or desire) drives influential understandings of temporality in the West from Augustine himself to a latter-day heir such as Hegel. And while the temporality of Derrida's living-together never achieves or allows the certain and assured fulfillment, the perfection or satisfaction, of Augustinian beatitude, he affirms that temporality no less, in its definitive openness and incompletion, as the condition of a mortal, and natal, life. Even more, as he suggests in the final seminar he taught before dying, he takes enjoyment itself to derive at its core from the mourning inherent to such temporality.[1] While love for the

1. In commenting on John Donne ("I run to death and death meets me as fast / And all my pleasures are like yesterday") and in explicating what it means to be as ever already having-been, Derrida writes that "I do not enjoy a pleasure first present that is immediately past, nostalgic, in mourning: no, the pleasure is born only of the mourning, of enjoyment as mourning. . . . I am from yesterday, I am no longer, I am no longer present, I am already yesterday, I enjoy from yesterday, not because I have enjoyed or have been, or because I was born yesterday, but because only yesterday will have given me, only my death or the feeling of my death, a death that will have taken me by speed, only my death lets me enjoy and take pleasure—in this very moment."

mortal is in Augustine a living death, in Derrida the eternality of the absolute would make for a dead life (and in this respect we can read him in the lineage of James Joyce and of the Samuel Beckett for whom Joyce's work is "purgatorial . . . [i]n the absolute absence of the Absolute"[2]).

Most inwardly, intimately, exposed to and touched by the foreignness of his mother's death, Derrida speaks to her no longer being able to call his name. She, having been shaped intimately by her exposure, through his brothers, to Derrida's ever-possible death, thus shaped him, intimately, in turn. In Derrida's responding, in what is already mournful memory, to the promise of a call that no longer comes (his mother's calling his name), we can sense an intergenerational binding, not of those who will keep and rejoin each other in the eternal, as Monica and Augustine believe they will, but of mortals who most intimately touch or cut into each other exactly through, and in, their separation. In this, I think, we can see operative in Derrida the intentionality of love as Martin Heidegger already understands it in his reading of poet Rainer Maria Rilke, where "those there are to love" are named "the ancestors, the dead, the children, those who are to come."[3]

The question of love, and of heart, in Heidegger's engagement with Rilke—which is for my interests here one of the more significant discussions of love in Heidegger—is framed in relation to Rilke's claim that our time is destitute (*dürftig*: impoverished, meager, shallow, insubstantial). The destitution of our time consists for Rilke not so much in the fact that God is dead but more in the fact that we have grown incapable of our mortality. Central to that incapability is our no longer knowing how death and love, along with pain, belong together. (As we'll see, Heidegger's engagement with Rilke along these lines would bear deeply on a more recent effort, like Judith Butler's, to identify and critique our contemporary "derealization" of death and mourning

Jacques Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 2:53. For a helpful full-length study of this last of Derrida's seminars, see Michael Naas, *The End of the World and Other Teachable Moments: Jacques Derrida's Final Seminar* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015); and for a briefer but far-reaching reading of the seminar's significance for the questions of gift, death, and legacy, see Mark C. Taylor, *Last Works: Lessons in Leaving* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), chap. 5.

2. Samuel Beckett, "Dante . . . Bruno. Vico . . . Joyce," cited and situated within a broader reading of Joyce and Derrida in my *Indiscrete Image*, 156.

3. Martin Heidegger, "What Are Poets For?" in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 128; "Wozu Dichter?" in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), 306. Hereafter cited parenthetically as WPF, English page number; WD, German page number.

through technoscientific media and related politics. It also bears significantly, or perhaps already draws on, the earlier critical engagement with media and their leveling effects in Søren Kierkegaard's "The Present Age."[4]) In the kind of doubling we've seen operative within the alienation of sin as Augustine understands it, or of despair in Kierkegaard, "the destitution is itself destitute because the realm of being withdraws within which pain and death and love belong together [Dürftig ist dieses Dürftige selbst, weil der Wesensbereich sich entzieht, in dem Schmerz und Tod und Liebe zusammengehören]" (WPF 130; WD 308). A thinking that proves open to, or opened by, the linkages among death, love, and pain will resist the logic of calculation, production, and consumption that Heidegger takes to be at work in the modern metaphysics and culture where the security of replication and replacement eclipses the fragility of the singular and the transient. Within the sway of modern man's rational-technological self-assertion, Heidegger contends, the "thought-contrived fabrications of calculated objects . . . are produced to be used up. The more quickly they are used up, the greater becomes the need to replace them ever more quickly and more readily" (WPF 130; WD 308) and thus "what is constant in things produced as objects merely for consumption is: the substitute—*Ersatz*" (WPF 130; WD 308). So construed, the temporality, and the tempo, of technoscientific fabrication can seem strangely to transcend the transience of things, and hence the danger of loss, through an endless movement of substitution; and in that way it can seem strangely to resemble, through a perverse imitation, the divine permanence that theological tradition associates with eternity.

In contrast to this logic of calculation and production, where nature itself is reduced to the realm of the calculable, and hence to that which man molds and controls, Heidegger evokes with Rilke (and Pascal) a logic of the heart, where heart proves more inward than the interior that belongs to calculating representation and also extends further than the realm of reproducible objects: "In modern metaphysics, the sphere of the invisible interior is defined as the realm of the presence of calculated objects. Descartes described this sphere as the consciousness of the *ego cogito*. / At nearly the same time as Descartes, Pascal discovers the logic of the heart as over against the logic of calculating reason [entdeckt Pascal gegenüber der Logik der rechnenden Vernunft die Logik des Herzens]. The inner and invisible domain of the heart is not

4. See esp. Judith Butler, "Violence, Mourning, Politics," in her *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (New York: Verso, 2004); and Søren Kierkegaard, "The Present Age," in his *Two Ages: A Literary Review*, trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

only more inward than the interior that belongs to calculating representation, and therefore more invisible; it also extends further than does the realm of merely producible objects" (WPF 127; WD 305–6). While modern metaphysics produces, through the rationality of human self-assertion, calculated and endlessly replaceable objects for the purposes of use and consumption—that is, the "thought-contrived fabrications of calculated objects" (WPF 129; WD 308)—the logic of the heart will attend to things in their fragility and to persons in their mortality.

Insofar as it draws explicitly on Pascal and thus implicitly on Augustine, this logic of the heart, while recalling Augustine's *interior intimo meo et superior summo meo*, also departs from Augustine in the character of its relation to the transient and mortal; by contrast to the rightly ordered love of Augustine, this heart's "letting-be" will not aim to recuperate the mortal, who passes, within the eternal where no one dear is lost. And while drawing on Rilke, it will seek to pass also beyond the metaphysics of interiority that Heidegger believes to remain operative in Rilke: the thinking of heart as presence and interiority gives way, in Heidegger, to a thinking of the interplay between interiority and exteriority, and of presence and absence, whose co-constitution precludes their independence and discretion: no innermost without exposure to the outermost, and no outermost except as touching the heart intimately. (We should note here, without being able to decide the matter, that a lucid reading like Michel Haar's can see in Rilke a thinking of the heart more aligned with Heidegger on this question than Heidegger himself may acknowledge: "Heidegger does not see, or pretends not to see, that the turn back toward the interior, the transformation of the outside into the inside, does not come about as a one-way movement. The discovery of the dimension of the heart implies a transposition and exposition of the interior to the exterior. Or, more radically, exteriority becomes interior. Or, still more radically, the 'pure space' of the heart of the world is no longer subjective or objective.")[5]

The fact that Heidegger evokes a thinking of the heart as a notable alternative to the calculating rationality of the modern metaphysics he sought throughout his writing and teaching to elucidate and overcome, suggests that love may move within Heidegger's thought more intimately than many read-

5. Michel Haar, "Rilke and the Interiority of the Earth," *The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being*, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), chap. 8; 130. (As we'll see in chap. 7, this formulation in Haar comes strikingly close to Stanley Cavell's understanding of the thinking of heart that he finds in Emerson and Heidegger.) See also Eric Santner's complication of Heidegger's situating Rilke within the metaphysics of interiority, in the first two chapters of his *On Creaturely Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

ers allow. More than a few interpreters, indeed, might counsel pause, or caution restraint, regarding any effort to read Heidegger as a thinker with something to say about—and still more with—love. Perhaps the most widely cited among those readers, Ludwig Binswanger, charges in his 1942 work *Grundformen und Erkenntnis des menschlichen Daseins*[6] (*Basic Forms and Knowledge of Human Dasein*) that Heidegger's *Being and Time*, by interpreting the truth of our Being-in-the-world as ever anxious and mortal "care," somehow "misses love"; love would therefore constitute for Binswanger a needed supplement to the question of care. Even more pointedly, Karl Jaspers asserts—and is often cited for asserting—that Heidegger's philosophy is "without love [ohne Liebe]" and thus itself "in its style" unlovable.[7] A more recent (and more nuanced) version of this charge might be seen to orient Marion's reading of Heidegger and Augustine in *Au lieu de soi*, which contends, as we saw, that when Heidegger turns from his seminar on Augustine in 1921 to *Being and Time*'s 1927 existential analysis and its horizon of mortality, he abandons not only the theological horizon of Augustine but also, thereby, the thought of love and its essential role within the teleological relation between care and enjoyment.[8]

6. Ludwig Binswanger, *Grundformen und Erkenntnis des menschlichen Daseins* (Zurich: Niehans, 1942). Given especially the centrality of love in recent phenomenology, it is noteworthy that Binswanger has received relatively little attention. A worthy effort to address this oversight can be found in Joeri Schrijvers's *Between Faith and Unbelief: Toward A Contemporary Phenomenology of Religious Life* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016). Schrijver's chapters on Binswanger and Binswanger's relation to Heidegger are informative and productive, though in the end quite at odds with the reading I attempt here insofar as he too readily accepts and perpetuates assumptions both about Heidegger and the role of death in his thinking (such as concerning "the authentic heroism of Dasein that faces (the possibility) of his or her imminent death," 233) and about love (such as concerning the "timelessness and infinity that are proper . . . to the experience of love," 233).

7. Karl Jaspers, *Notizen zu Heidegger* (Munich: Hans Saner, 1978), 34, quoted in Christophe Perrin, "Les sources augustiniennes du concept d'amour chez Heidegger," in *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 107, no. 2 (2009): 240.

8. See along related lines Norman Wirzba's "Love's Reason: From Heideggerian Care to Christian Charity": "In any event, I would like to suggest that if Heidegger had not abandoned his project of developing a description of Christian facticity, he might have discovered a conception of reason that, while somewhat at odds with an Aristotelian conception, nonetheless is as rich and deep as the Greek facticity he did eventually develop. / We can locate the point of alteration in the choice Heidegger made to stress care as *Bekümmerung* and then *Sorge*, rather than *Liebe*," in *Postmodern Philosophy and Christian Thought*, ed. Merold Westphal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 258. Wirzba's reading aligns with John Caputo's earlier and energetic argument organized around a distinction between Heidegger's overly Greek and philosophical analysis of *Sorge* and a more biblical and religious thinking of care in terms of heart or *kardia*; though perhaps overstated, and leaving largely untouched what Heidegger actually

The charge that Heidegger overlooks, abandons, or otherwise fails on the question of love—saying too little about it and/or affording it no meaningful role in his philosophical work—often takes this failure to be a function of Heidegger's purported preoccupation with death and thus of the extreme isolation or abandonment, self-involvement, or even solipsistic "autarchy" of Dasein in its "anticipatory resoluteness" [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit] before death. That preoccupation, correlatively, is often contrasted with the attentiveness to birth and beginning, relation, and plurality that are read to distinguish the thinking of Heidegger's student and lover Hannah Arendt, who is thus taken to succeed in attending to love as Heidegger is said not to.[9] Arendt's biographer Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, for example, writes that "what Arendt owed to Heidegger is not immediately obvious and does not relate to any exposition of the concept of love in his work. Love is mentioned in *Being and Time* only once, in a footnote. . . . But though no philosophical exploration of love by Heidegger influenced her, she may well have been influenced by his *lack* of concern. Jaspers had noted what Arendt, in far more personal terms, knew: the Heideggerian philosophy is, as he said, '*ohne Liebe: Daher auch im Stil unliebenswürdig* [without love: hence also in an unloveable style].' With years of critical distance, Arendt herself pointed to a grave weakness in Heidegger's early work: 'The most essential characteristic of this Self is absolute egoism, its radical separation from its fellows.'"[10] In the pres-

does say about heart and love, Caputo's critique productively calls our attention to Heidegger's relative inattention to matters of the flesh and its pain: "[Heidegger] was very responsive to the *Sorge*, the care for one's being-in-the-world, but he entirely missed the *cura*, the healings, the caring for the flesh of the other, the *kardia*. For *cura* also means healing the flesh of the other, tending to the other's pain and afflicted flesh. To put this as ironically as possible, the author of *Being and Time* never really thought *cura* all the way through," in chap. 3, "Sorge and Kardia," John D. Caputo, *Demythologizing Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 72.

9. The reference to Arendt in this regard often seems also to carry with it the suspicion that the moral failure involved in Heidegger's Nazism would render absent, invalid, or at best highly questionable any role for love in Heidegger's thought (as if love were a guarantee against evil—itself a thought in no small tension with decisive Augustinian insights). For two deeply thoughtful reconsiderations of Heidegger's Nazism in relation to his philosophy (and in light of the recently published *Black Notebooks*), see David Farrell Krell, *Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from* Being and Time *to the* Black Notebooks (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), and Elliot R. Wolfson, *The Duplicity of Philosophy's Shadow: Heidegger, Nazism, and the Jewish Other* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

10. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 75; Jaspers, *Notizen zu Heidegger*, 34; Arendt, "What Is Existenz Philosophy?" *Partisan Review* 8, no. 1 (Winter 1946): 50. See also Arendt's *Life of the Mind* (New York: Harcourt, 1978), 216–17: "According to [Augustine], as we know, God created man as a temporal creature, *homo temporalis*; time and man were created together, and this temporality was affirmed

ent chapter I will argue, to the contrary, that the mortality Heidegger elucidates is integral to a love that his writing does in fact repeatedly reference, and his thinking engage, from early seminars like *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1919–20) and the first seminar on Augustine (1921); to *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* (1925) and *Being and Time* itself; through important texts from the 1930s on Schelling,[11] Nietzsche,[12] and (in a 1930–

by the fact that each man owed his life not just to the multiplication of the species, but to birth, the entry of a novel creature who *as* something entirely new appears in the midst of the time continuum of the world. The purpose of the creation of man was to make possible a *beginning*: 'That there be a beginning man was created, before whom nobody was'—'*Initium . . . ergo ut esset, creatus est homo, ante quem nullus fuit.*' The very capacity for beginning is rooted in *natality*, and by no means in creativity, not in a gift but in the fact that human beings, new men, again and again appear in the world by virtue of birth"; and Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, 1998), 177–78: "Because they are *initium*, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into action. [*Initium*] *ergo ut esset, creatus est homo, ante quem nullus fuit* ('that there be a beginning, man was created before whom there was nobody'), said Augustine in his political philosophy. This beginning is not the same as the beginning of the world; it is not the beginning of something but of somebody, who is a beginner himself. With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was created when man was created but not before. . . . The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this again is possible only because each man is unique, so that which each birth something uniquely new comes into the world. With respect to this somebody who is unique it can be truly said that nobody was there before. If action as beginning corresponds to the fact of birth, if it is the actualization of the human condition of natality, then speech corresponds to the fact of distinctness and is the actualization of the human condition of plurality, that is, as living as a distinct and unique being among equals" (177–78). See along similar lines Simon Critchley: "Philosophy is an art of dying—an art of dying well, *ars moriendi*, from Socrates to Heidegger. But shouldn't this obsession with death invite some suspicion? I've begun to think so in the last couple of years. Hannah Arendt, in *The Life of the Mind*, criticizes philosophers, male philosophers, for their persistent obsession with death to the exclusion of the question of birth. For her, the issue is about natality, on the one hand, and the question of love, on the other—her doctoral dissertation was on the question of love in Augustine. Is philosophy capable of thinking the question of love?" in Simon Critchley and Carl Cederström, *How to Stop Living and Start Worrying* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 60.

11. "But according to Schelling's formulation of the concept of freedom, human freedom is the center of philosophy because from it as the center the whole movement of the creature's becoming as the creator's becoming and as the eternal becoming of the Absolute becomes visible in a unified way in its opposition, its strife. According to the ancient saying of Heraclitus, strife is the basic law and the basic power of Being. But the greatest strife is love because it arouses the deepest discord in order to be itself in conquering it." Martin Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), 162.

12. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art*, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1979; from a lecture course, 1936–37; reworked and first published

31 seminar) Augustine again; to "Letter on Humanism" (1946–47), "What Are Poets For?" (1946), his last university course, "What Is Called Thinking?" (1951–52), and his response to Binswanger himself in the Zollikon seminars in the 1960s—to mention just a few key moments.[13] From the apprehensive understanding that opens our worlds (where "understanding is in love [In der *Liebe* ist Verstehen]"[14]) to the basic work of philosophical questioning (which entails a being on the way of eros[15]), from our constitutive sociality (where Being-with is irreducible) to its intergenerational tradition or transmission (where we are bound to the dead and those to come)—love, along with heart and its affection, plays a fundamental role that Heidegger not only points to but practices in his philosophy. While not tracing that role fully here (the goal of a larger work to come), this chapter does aim at least to suggest the range of love's operation in Heidegger while focusing on the contribution his thought can make to my own central inquiry into the interplay of love and mortal temporality. In framing that focus, we should keep in mind both 1) that critics often contend or insinuate that Heidegger's failure on the

in 1961), 47: "Usually Nietzsche employs the word 'passion' interchangeably with 'affect.' But if anger and hate, for example, or joy and love, not only are different as one affect is from another, but are distinct as affects and passions respectively, then here too we need a more exact definition. Hate too cannot be produced by a decision; it too seems to overtake us—in a way similar to that when we are seized by anger. Nevertheless, the manner in which it comes over us is essentially different. Hate can explode suddenly . . . only because it has been growing in us for a long time, and, as we say, been nurtured in us. But something can be nurtured only if it is already there and alive. In contrast, we do not say and never believe that anger is nurtured. Because hate lurks much more deeply in the origins of our being it has a cohesive power; like love, hate brings an original cohesion and perdurance to our being."

13. For a quite helpful accounting of relevant texts, as related especially to Augustine, see Perrin, "Les sources augustiniennes,"239–67. Others studies to see in Heidegger an important role played by love include Giorgio Agamben's "The Passion of Facticity," in *Potentialities*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Valeria Piazza, "L'amour en retrait," in Agamben and Piazza, *L'ombre de l'amour: Le concept d'amour chez Heidegger* (Paris: Editions Payot et Rivage, 2003); Françoise Dastur, "Phénoménologie et thérapie dans les Zollikoner Seminare," in Jean-François Courtine, *Figures de la subjectivité: Approches phénoménologiques et Psychiatriques* (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1992); and Pierre-Étienne Schmit, "L'amour en finitude, la question de l'amour dans l'oeuvre de Martin Heidegger," in *Le Philosophoire* 2000/1, no. 11.

14. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Scott M. Campbell (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 129; *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20), Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993, 2010), 58:168.

15. See the student notes for the 1930–31 seminar on Augustine, in Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe IV. Abteilung: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen. Seminare: Platon—Aristoteles—Augustinus* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2012), 83:79.

question of love is somehow a function of his purportedly excessive or distorted preoccupation with mortality and 2) that in his thought of mortality especially Heidegger may deviate from the Augustine whom he also inherits, in nonetheless deep ways, within his construal of selfhood and temporality.

A claim like Young-Bruehl's is at best incomplete, and in the end, I think, just incorrect, that *Being and Time* mentions love only once, and in a footnote. She is not alone, though, in overlooking a link that Heidegger in fact straightforwardly asserts, in one of the work's foundational claims, between love and the basic state of Dasein as Being-*in*-the world. As is well known among readers of Heidegger and his heirs, the kind of Being at the center of analysis in *Being and Time*—our temporal, finite, and mortal existence, or Dasein, as "Being-in-the-world"—is for Heidegger a "unitary phenomenon" to which "Being-in" belongs essentially. "Being-in," he posits, is a basic state of Dasein whose two possible turns are "concern" (*Besorgen*) and "solicitude" (*Fürsorge*), which is to say Dasein's dealing with things and Dasein's relations with other people (see BT 221; SZ 176). Being-in, Heidegger emphasizes, is not at all to be understood as the geometrically construed spatial relation of one-thing-inside-another-thing, like water in a glass, or a body locatable (by GPS, say) within a neutral, geometric grid. Being-in is rather a *way* or mode of Dasein's Being. It is inseparable from the basic kind of Being at stake in our Dasein, and thus it is what Heidegger calls an *existentiale.*[16]

To elucidate his distinctive take on what Dasein's "in-ness" or "in-being" means, Heidegger appeals to Jacob Grimm's short etymological discussions, in the seventh volume of Grimm's *Kleinere Schriften*, of the prepositions "*in*" and "*bei.*" Emphasizing that the Being at stake for Dasein is in each case mine, "that entity which in each case I myself am [*bin*]" (BT 80; SZ 54), Heidegger follows Grimm's linkage of the expression "*bin*" (first person singular, present indicative of the verb *Sein*, to be) to the preposition "*bei*," indicating nearness, proximity, or at-homeness. The most basic state, or way, of Dasein's Being, in other words, is some primordial familiarity or intimacy: "The expression '*bin*' is connected with '*bei*,' and so '*ich bin*' ['I am'] means in its turn 'I reside' or 'dwell alongside' the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. 'To be' [*Sein*], as the infinitive of '*ich bin*' (that is, when it is understood as an *existentiale*), signifies 'to reside alongside . . . ,'

16. "Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale. So one cannot think of it as the Being present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) 'in' an entity that is present-at-hand. Nor does the term 'Being-in' mean a spatial 'in-one-another-ness' of things present-at-hand, any more than the word 'in' primordially signifies a spatial relationship of this kind" (BT 79–80; SZ 54).

'to be familiar with . . .'" (BT 80; SZ 54). What goes largely overlooked and unexplored among critics and even readers of Heidegger is that he, working with the Grimm etymology, here goes on to name Dasein's familiarity with the world—that is, Dasein's basic state of Being—in terms of love. The seemingly spatial preposition "in," Grimm helps Heidegger to see, stems more deeply from a verbal form for dwelling that entails, essentially, a caring diligence, which can well be translated as a mode of loving: "'*In*' is derived from '*innan*'—'to reside,' '*habitare*,' 'to dwell.' '*An*' signifies 'I am accustomed,' 'I am familiar with,' 'I look after something.' It has the signification of '*colo*' in the senses of '*habito*' and '*diligo*'" (BT 80; SZ 54).

Thus, as he introduces his readers to the most basic state of Dasein's Being, the very center of his book's subsequent analyses, Heidegger signals that the enactment of Being as dwelling in the world is a form of loving: through *colo*, the *habito*, "I dwell" (or inhabit, in familiarity, habitually) is tied essentially to *diligo*, "I love" (in care and attentiveness). Drawing on Latin rather than on his more usually preferred Greek, Heidegger appeals to an essential tie between dwelling and the intimacy of a loving care. "*Colo*" is richly suggestive in just these directions, entailing as it does inhabitation through and thanks to cultivation, keeping, tending, looking after (as in agriculture), or indeed devotion in the sense of the cultus, the religious devotion thanks to which gods dwell in a place and bring it protection. (Though I've not come across any reference to them by Heidegger, one finds striking passages in Augustine noting the various senses of *colo*—to mark the inadequacy of *cultus* as a name for, and Latin as a language for naming with one word, worship of the one true God, whose worship finds its more appropriate single name for Augustine in the Greek *latreia.*[17])

Such appeal to the primal intimacy and caring devotion, or, in short, to the love, that defines Dasein's "Being-in" does important work within—and is also illuminated by—Heidegger's rejection of the epistemological, and on-

17. "*Latreia*, however, is always—or so frequently as to be almost always—used, by those who have written down the divine eloquence for us, to designate that service which pertains to the worship of God. Such worship cannot simply be called *cultus*, for this seems to mean a service which is not due to God alone: we frequently 'cultivate' men also, either their memory or in person. Also we say that we 'cultivate' not only those things to which we subject ourselves in religious humility, but also certain things which are subject to ourselves. For from the verb 'to worship' [*colere*] we derive 'farmers' [*agricolae*], 'colonists' [*coloni*], and 'inhabitants' [*incoli*]; and the gods themselves are called *caelicolae* for no other reason than that they 'cultivate' the heavens [*caelum colant*]: not, of course, by worshipping them, but by dwelling there, as if they were a kind of celestial colonists," Augustine, *City of God* 10.1. It is worth noting that Augustine here associates dwelling with a gesture of subjugation or domination that Heidegger would not.

tological, grounds on which the problem of skepticism is often formulated. More fundamental than the question of knowing in a theoretical or scientific sense, and deeper than the epistemological question that philosophy might pose, is our being *already in* the world through a binding intimacy that first yields, structures, and sustains our openness to the very existence wherein alone the question of knowing might eventually be construed as problematic and in need of theoretical, scientific, or philosophical response. The epistemological problem based on a model of consciousness as a kind of cabinet or enclosed interior into which one hopes to deliver "knowledge" asks "how this knowing subject comes out of its inner 'sphere' into one which is 'other and external'" (BT 87; SZ 60).[18] Within such a model, the trick is somehow to get "outside" of my (subjective) cabinet of a mind to the (objective) "world" "over there," "outside" of "me" (as mind), in order then eventually to come back "inside" and report to the mind, more or less adequately, with representations of that objective world, now "known" by and "within" me, the subject; but such an approach, Heidegger convincingly argues, ignores the more fundamental—affective—binds that already tie world and Dasein in such a way that these seemingly fundamental dichotomies of "subject" and "object," "inside" and "outside," do not hold. Ignoring "that every act of knowing always already takes place on the basis of the mode of being of Dasein which we call in-being, that is, being-always-already involved with-a-world,"[19] it likewise misconstrues the co-constitutive interplay of what we sometimes call—misleadingly—Dasein's "inside" and "outside":

> When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always "outside" alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when Dasein dwells alongside the entity to be known, and determines its character; but even in this "Being-outside" alongside the object, Dasein is still "inside," if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself "inside" as a Being-in-the-world which knows. And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the "cabinet" of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows *remains outside*, and it does so *as Dasein*. (BT 89; SZ 62)[20]

18. See the close parallel worked out already in Heidegger's 1925 lectures, published in English as *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 160; Heidegger, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, in *Gesamtausgabe II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923–1944*, vol. 20, 216 (hereafter GA 20, page number): "[How] does knowing, which according to its being is inside, in the subject, come out of its 'inner sphere' into an 'other, outer sphere,' into the world?"

19. Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 161; GA 20, 217.

Because defined fundamentally as Being-in-the-world, Dasein is—most "inwardly," or "immanently"—in being always already bound to the world that stands "beyond" it, "outside." This interplay of inward and outward within the basic state of Dasein's Being recalls, to my reading, the essential tie within Augustine's construal of selfhood between the *interior intimo meo* and the *superior summo meo*. The "most" intimate (strictly redundant, as *intimus* is already the superlative "inmost") and the most distant or outward are co-constitutive within, and of, Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Heidegger is well underway with this direction of thinking in the late teens and early 1920s, when he is also reading and teaching Augustine. One can see it both in his first extant courses, "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview" (War Emergency Semester 1919) and "Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value" (Summer Semester 1919), and then in his *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Winter Semester 1919–20). In "The Idea of Philosophy," the interplay of inward and outward is even framed in the terms—so important for Heidegger's later thinking—of the mineness and event-character of experience: "Lived experience does not pass in front of me like a thing, but I appropriate [er-eigne] it to myself, and it appropriates [er-eignet] itself according to its essence. . . . Event of appropriation is not to be taken as if I appropriate the lived experience to myself from outside or from anywhere else; 'outer' and 'inner' have as little meaning here as 'physical' and 'psychical.' The experiences are events of appropriation in so far as they are lived out of one's 'own-ness,' and life lives only in this way."[21]

20. Again, parallel passages in Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 164; GA 20, 221: "In directing-itself-toward and apprehending, Dasein does not first get out of itself, out of its inner sphere in which it is encapsulated. Rather, its very sense is to be *always already 'outside'* in the world, in the rightly understood sense of 'outside' as in-being and dwelling with the world, which in each instance is already uncovered in some way. Dwelling with the matter to be known does not involve abandonment of the inner sphere, as if Dasein leaps out of its sphere and is no longer in it but is found only at the object. Dasein in this 'being outside' with the object is also 'inside,' rightly understood; for it is as being-in-the-world that Dasein itself knows the entity. [And in turn,] the apprehending of what is known is not like returning from an expedition of plunder with its acquired booty back into the 'housing' of consciousness, of immanence; for in the very apprehending as well and in having, preserving, and retaining what is apprehended, the knowing Dasein remains 'outside.'"

21. Heidegger, "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview," in *Toward the Definition of Philosophy*, trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2008), 60; *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, in Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe II. Abteiling: Vorlesungen*, 56/57:75. Along related

It is not by chance that we can hear an Augustinian resonance here, for in his definition and elucidation of Dasein's diligent being "in," Heidegger draws explicitly on the Augustinian tradition's founding of knowledge in love. This line of thinking is explicit in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, which not only cites Augustine's "believe, so that you may understand [crede, ut intelligas],"[22] but also then goes on to suggest that "understanding is in *love* [In der *Liebe* ist Verstehen]."[23] Even more, while interpreting Augustine's imperative to say "live your self vitally—and understanding establishes itself only on this ground of experience,"[24] Heidegger's construal of such experiential understanding as love evokes also—fragmentarily but suggestively—the interplay of inward and outward that characterizes both the self in Augustine and Dasein in Heidegger: "Understanding is in *love*," Heidegger's notes read, then elaborating, "to *achieve* in *devotion*—not in facts, but rather in meaning, as vital relations of life [in der *Hingabe*—nicht an Tatsachen, sondern an Sinn, als lebendige Bezüge des Lebens *gewinnen*]. . . . to love the nearness . . . and so to come into the genuine farness of the origin [sondern die Nähe lieben. . . und so in die echte Ferne des Ursprungs zu kommen]."[25] In subsequent teaching and writing like *History of the Concept of Time* and then *Being and Time* itself, Heidegger comments further on this Augustinian ground for the construal of this primordial and affective experience, noting for example that

> knowing is nothing but a mode of being-in-the-world; specifically, it is *not even a primary* but *a founded way of being in the world*, a way which is always possible only on the basis of a non-cognitive comportment.
>
> What we have set forth here as the in-being of Dasein and characterized in greater detail is the ontological fundament for what Augustine and Pascal already noted. They called that which actually knows not knowing but *love and hate*. All knowing is only an appropriation and a form of realization of other primary comportments. Knowing is rather more likely to cover up something which was originally uncovered in non-cognitive comportment.
>
> What Augustine identifies as love and hate and only in certain contexts specifies as Dasein's authentically knowing mode of being [als eigentlich erkennenden Seinsart des Daseins] we shall later have to take as an original phenomenon of Dasein. . . ."[26]

By defining and elucidating Dasein's "being-in" not according to spatialized inside-ness of things present-at-hand but instead as a pretheoretical, interested, and affective mode of being—a diligent familiarity that structures and sustains the very world that structures and sustains my Being—Heidegger is advancing an insight elaborated within *Being and Time*'s analysis of "state-of-mind" and "mood" as that which always already discloses our world, prior to cognition and volition and beyond, or before, not only the distinction of inside and outside, subject and object, immanence and transcendence, but also, correlatively, activity and passivity. The mood in which Dasein always already finds itself is neither simply passive nor yet wholly active but falls somewhere closer to the middle voice. A mood—such as love, which in his 1930 seminar on Augustine he counts explicitly as a fundamental mood of philosophy—befalls me even as I participate in it. It is neither simply inward nor yet outward. I am "in" a mood, but that mood is also "in" me, exceeding me while also touching and shaping me most inwardly, intimately. Mood thus signals the sense in which the seeming externality of world constitutes, and is constituted by, Dasein's very core—even as that core is essential, inherent, to the world's ever opening and appearing at all (see BT 176; SZ 136–37).

If the fundamental mood treated most famously and most extensively in *Being and Time* appears on the face to be anxiety and not love, one should note both that mood as such is a form of being-in, and hence already a diligence, and that Heidegger's analysis of anxiety itself, as grounded in care, draws fairly directly on Augustine's analysis of his own unsettled heart, the *cor inquietum*, whose various fears amount to various turns of love.[27] As Hei-

lines, see, among other passages, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 31; GA 58, 39: "Life in this environing-world, being in it, the environmental existence, this unstable circumstantiality determines itself out of a peculiar *self-permeating* of the environing world, with-world, and self-world, not out of their mere aggregation. The *relations* of the self-*permeating* are absolutely of a non-theoretical, *emotional* kind. I am not the observer and least of all am I the theorizing knower of myself and my life in the world."

22. Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Pheomenology*, 48; GA 58, 62.

23. Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 129; GA 58, 168.

24. Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 48; GA 58, 62.

25. Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 129; GA 58, 168.

26. Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 164–65; GA 20, 222. See also the passage and note in *Being and Time* concerning Scheler's "accepting the challenges of Augustine and Pascal" within a "consideration of how acts which 'represent' and acts which 'take an interest' are interconnected in their foundations" (BT 178, and n. v; SZ 139, and n. 1).

27. Heidegger's treatment of mood goes back also fundamentally to Aristotle's treatment of the *pathe* in his *Rhetoric*, to which he also traces Augustine's treatment of fear. See, e.g., the section "Fear as being afraid of something considered in its four essential moments," in *History of*

degger signals in a response to Binswanger during the Zollikon seminars, the charge that the analysis of care needs a supplemental treatment of love ignores the deeper sense in which care and love remain already inseparable—a point noted and explored already in the late teens and early twenties, where "in '*inquietum cor nostrum*' [our hearts are restless] Augustine saw the great incessant disquiet of life. He gained a wholly original aspect, not at all just a theoretical one. Rather he lived *in it* and brought it to expression";[28] and where the "trembling of the heart" in Augustine is "a phenomenon that is constitutive of the concern [Bekümmerung] for oneself. Slipping away from it is a self-removal from the '*caste timere te*' [chaste fearing of You], the *pure* fearing of God" (PRL 223; GA 60 294). The ground of fear in love is likewise made clear in Heidegger's 1925 *History of the Concept of Time*, where he notes that "theologically, the problem of fear is of special significance in connection with the theory of repentance, penance, love toward God, love of God, which itself substantiates fear."[29] Of course, two years later, in noting the "double meaning of the term '*cura*' according to which it signifies not only 'anxious exertion' but also 'carefulness' and 'devotedness' ['Sorgfalt,' 'Hingabe']" (BT 243; SZ 199), Heidegger will make clear the import of the Christian and Augustinian contribution to the heritage of the term: "Even as early as the Stoics *merimna* was a firmly established term, and it recurs in the New Testament, becoming '*sollicitudo*' in the Vulgate. The way in which 'care' is viewed in the foregoing existential analytic of Dasein, is one which has grown upon the author in connection with his attempts to interpret Augustinian (i.e. Helleno-Christian) anthropology with regard to the foundational principles reached in the ontology of Aristotle" (BT 492, n. vii; SZ 199, n. 1). Just as fear in Augustine can take two different turns, so likewise love; and, in Heidegger's analysis of solicitude, or Dasein's "care-for" those others with whom Dasein always already dwells essentially, one can indeed hear significant echoes of

the Concept of Time, 284; GA 20, 393: "This phenomenon was first investigated by Aristotle in the context of an analysis of the passions, the *pathe*, in his *Rhetoric*. The analysis of fear which Aristotle presents here as well as his analysis of the emotions generally serve to define the interpretation of the Stoics and so that of Augustine and the middle ages." A few pages later, Heidegger notes also that "It was seven years ago, while I was investigating these structures in conjunction with my attempts to arrive at the ontological foundations of Augustinian anthropology, that I first came upon the phenomenon of care" (302; GA 20, 418).

28. Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Pheomenology*, 48; GA 58, 62 (my emphasis).

29. Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 285; GA 20, 393–94. Heidegger draws here on A. W. Hunzinger, "Das Furchtproblem in der katholischen Lehre von Augustin bis Luther," *Lutherstudien* 2 (1906), first section.

the distinction Augustine makes between the two different turns that human love can take.

The existing caricature is however widespread, coming to recent expression, for example, in Peter Sloterdijk's charge that a purportedly hasty turn in *Being and Time* from the "where" to the "who" "leaves behind a lonely, weak, hysterical-heroic existential subject that thinks it is the first to die, and remains pitifully uncertain of the more hidden aspects of its embeddedness in intimacies and solidarities."[30] Despite the caricature, however, *Being and Time* remains fairly clear that the care according to which Dasein is that being for whom, in its Being that Being itself is an issue, or that being who is affectively interested in its Being and does not simply gaze at it theoretically, always entails also, furthermore, the care of any one particular Dasein not only for itself and its Being (according to the caricature, seen also, for example, in Arendt's claim concerning Dasein's egoism and separation) but also for other Dasein and their Being: other Dasein and their Being are from the start inherent to the Being of any one given Dasein: "Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, which is an issue for Dasein in its very Being. Thus, as Being-with, Dasein 'is' essentially for the sake of Others [Als Mitsein 'ist' daher das Dasein wesenhaft umwillen Anderer]. This must be understood as an existential statement as to its essence. Even if the particular factical Dasein does *not* turn to others, and supposes that it has no need of them or manages to get along without them, it *is* in the way of Being-with" (BT 160; SZ 123). If Being-with others belongs ever already to my own Being, then that Being-with is likewise fundamentally at issue in the Being that is definitively at issue for me as Dasein. In my existence, then, others have always already been disclosed to me, and that disclosedness of others constitutes nothing less than "significance—that is to say, worldhood" (BT 160; SZ 123).

The difference between Heidegger and an important critic like Levinas on the question of my relation to the other stems from the role played by the world in such relation: while for Levinas it is the other who first appears unconditionally—prior to and beyond any horizons such as those of culture, history, or world itself—so to make eventually significant any world, for Heidegger the disclosedness of others and the significance that makes for a world are inextricably interwoven. From this latter perspective, the singularity of any other is essentially bound up with her—irreplaceable—place in the world that I share with her, even as the significance of any worldly place to

30. Peter Sloterdijk, *Bubbles: Spheres*. Vol. 1: *Microspherology*, trans. Wieland Hoban (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 341.

me depends on others' relations to that place. In short, my care for the other is essential to the world's significance, even as that world and its significance-structures afford and sustain my care for any others.[31]

As I've suggested, important interpreters of Heidegger, like Marion, have seen in the treatment of care and the solicitude inherent to it less an extension of, and more a departure from, the treatment of love in Augustine, which does occupy Heidegger in his summer 1921 seminar "Augustine and Neoplatonism." However, the pivotal definition of love evoked in that reading of Augustine (and not only recurring in various formulations across the sweep of Heidegger's career but also evoked by Arendt herself) does suggest to my reading something deeply akin to what *Being and Time* understands by our constitutive care for other Dasein [Fürsorge]. This similarity is especially striking in the distinction made between two different turns of love in the Augustine seminar and two different directions of solicitude in *Being and Time.*

In the Augustine seminar, Heidegger notes that for Augustine—here citing from Augustine's *Tractates on the First Epistle of John* 8.5, which echoes Aristotle's understanding of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics*[32]—"we

31. Being-in-the-world is not, then, as Levinas claims, a reduction of the other to the same insofar as that Being always occurs in the singular. On this I agree with Jean-Luc Nancy, who in Heidegger's treatment of care sees, as I do, a thinking of love. As Nancy writes in "Shattered Love," in *The Inoperative Community*, trans. Peter Connor et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 103: "The shared world as the world of care-for-the-other is a world of the crossing of singular beings by this sharing that constitutes them, that makes them to be, by addressing them one to the other, which is to say one by the other beyond the one and the other"; from this perspective, Nancy rightly notes the import of Levinas in calling our attention to Being-with, while also rejecting Levinas's charge that Being in Heidegger entails a reduction of the other to the same: "I can be in solidarity with Levinas' distaste for certain accents, shall we say, of dereliction in Heidegger's discourse. But in the *es gibt* ('it gives [itself]') of Being, one can see everything except 'generality.' *There is* the 'each time,' an-archic in fact (or even archi-archic, as Derrida might say?), of an existing, singular occurrence. *There is no* existing without existents, and *there is no* 'existing' by itself, no concept—it does not *give itself*—but there is always being, precise and hard, the theft of the generality. Being is at stake there, it is in shatters, offered dazzling, multiplied, shrill and singular, hard and cut across: its being is there. Being-with is constitutive of this stake—and that is what Levinas, before anyone, understood. But being-with takes place only according to the occurrence of being, or its posing into shatters. And the crossing—the coming-and-going, the comings-and-goings of love—is constitutive of the occurrence. This takes place before the face and signification. Or rather, this takes place on another level: *at the heart* of being" (Nancy, "Shattered Love," 105).

32. See Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, 8.2: "Now there are three grounds on which people love; of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word 'friendship'; for it is not mutual love, nor is it a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself); but to a friend

should not love the human being the way gourmands talk when they say: I love wild game [Krammetsvögel = fieldfare]. The gourmand loves them only to kill them. So he loves them such that they are not (*non esse*). One may not love human beings in this way, assigning them into one's aims" (PRL 220–21; GA 60, 291). Augustine contrasts genuine love for the human with this love that gives nonbeing to the beloved by subjecting the beloved to one's own aims. He likewise contrasts it with the related logic of a self-love [Selbst-liebe] or love of oneself [Eigenliebe] that proves in fact to be self-hate insofar as it "has the tendency," in Heidegger's gloss, "to secure one's own being [das eigene Sein zu sichern], but in the wrong way: not as self-care but as the calculation of the experiential complex in relation to one's self-world [aber in verkehrter Weise, nicht als Selbstbekümmerung, sondern als Berechnung des Erfahrungszusammenhangs in bezug auf die Selbstwelt]" (PRL 221; GA 60, 292; translation modified).

Suggesting already Heidegger's later distinction between the self's authentic care and its inauthentic concern with the distracted busyness of the "they-self," this contrast frames Augustine's understanding of "authentic love [die eigentliche Liebe]," which he understands to have "a basic tendency toward the *dilectum ut sit* [being loved so that the beloved may be]. Thus, love is the will toward the being [or the "to be"] of the loved one [Liebe ist also Wille zum Sein des Geliebten]" (PRL 221; GA 60, 291–92). Understood in these terms, involving the interplay of a genuine self-concern or self-care (by contrast to the deluded security of worldly calculation)[33] and a love that wills the other's authentic being (by contrast to a kind of nonbeing wherein the other simply serves the lover's calculating aims) "with-worldly love has the sense of helping the loved other toward his existence, so that he comes to himself [Mitweltliche Liebe hat den Sinn, dem geliebten Anderen zur Existenz zu verhelfen, so daß er zu sich selbst kommt]" (PRL 221; GA 60, 292; translation modified). By contrast to forms of love that consume the other and aim to

we say we ought to wish what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it *is* reciprocal being friendship." In *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:1826.

33. The term translated here as "self-concern," *Selbstbekümmerung*, contains the term—*Bekümmerung*—with which Heidegger translates Augustine's *cura*, or care, which in *Being and Time* becomes *Sorge*. One could see here, then, in the distinction between "self-concern" and a "calculation of the experiential complex," what becomes in *Being and Time* the distinction between the care that gives me authentically to myself, on the one hand, and, on the other, the kinds of busy worldly concern that, through my absorption in them, sustain a falling in which I can lose or forget myself.

secure the self on its own terms, thus eclipsing the ex-istence or standing-out from herself that gives the other back to herself, genuine love here gives me to myself (as lover) only in giving me over to the existence of the other—who comes to herself, in turn, only in being likewise ex-posed, standing out from herself. Solicitude in *Being and Time* operates in much the same fashion—with the crucial difference that in Heidegger the other's existence entails the inescapable insecurity of her temporal Being-in-the-world, whereas in Augustine the other's existence is referred back to the ultimate security of an eternal God beyond the world.

To read in Heidegger as I do the suggestion of such a condition for love in mortality may seem misguided to interpreters like Marion (or Sloterdijk or Harrison or Levinas or Arendt) insofar as my Being-toward-death is said to be nonrelational [unbezüglich], giving me my "authenticity" [Eigentlichkeit] through "anticipatory resoluteness" [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]—and hence, such interpreters would contend, in an isolated egoism or even in the "autarchy" of a purported self-possession. In resistance to these directions of reading, I question two points that can tend to be variously operative in them: (1) the assumptions made about love's relational character (for love, I think, as much as relating me to the other, and in the very measure of doing so, also individualizes and isolates me in a manner akin to that of Being-toward-death) and (2) the understanding of Being-toward-death's nonrelational character (for that itself should be understood also, I think, as a condition of our genuine solicitude, or of our love, for others: on this view, the separated being, or the noncoincidence of mortals with one another, is essential to the love relation—which requires, as Anne Carson beautifully suggests, the edges or boundaries of selves which keep the space or distance across which love and its desire live[34]).

(1) As I've noted in previous readings, an important—Augustinian—construal of love appears in letters that Heidegger writes to his student and lover Hannah Arendt. While one might want to question (as George Pattison does[35]) the evocation of a personal love letter (and written moreover to a student) within a philosophical discussion of love, we can note that Heidegger's treatment of love in his letters to Arendt aligns quite closely with discussions of love that appear elsewhere in his writing and teaching both before and

34. Anne Carson, *Eros the Bittersweet* (Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998; originally Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); see esp. the sweep of chapters treating "the edge," 30–62.

35. See George Pattison, *Heidegger on Death: A Critical Theological Essay* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013), 126, n. 30.

after the letters to Arendt. For example, much in line with his discussion of Augustinian love in the 1921 seminar, in his 1938–39 work *Mindfulness* (*Besinnung*, written just after *Contributions to Philosophy*) Heidegger understands love as a letting-be that refuses to demand or create either ideals or a beloved who would conform to them—and which thus suggests (as we'll see also in the letters) the lover's exposure to the beloved's becoming. "Love," he writes "is the will that wills the beloved *be*; the will that wills that the beloved find its way unto its ownmost and sway therein. Such a will does not wish and demand anything. Through honoring, and not by trying to create the loved one, this will lets above all the loved one—what is worthy of loving—'become.' The word 'love' calls what is worthy to be loved 'wisdom.'"[36] One can be struck by how closely Heidegger's understanding of nonidealizing or nonidolatrous love in the Arendt letters is echoed here in a philosophical text that not only offers the same definition of love but links that definition of love directly also to the definition of philosophy itself—to the point that one might not only question the distinction Pattison wants to draw between love letter and philosophical writing but indeed wonder whether that epistolary relation is not itself a practice of philosophy (and/or whether philosophy, and teaching, do not involve already an erotics akin to that operative in the epistolary relation[37]). Thus, describing in his letters to Arendt a love whose definition repeats the Augustinian understanding signaled already in his 1921 Augustine seminar, and then repeated in this and other later texts, where love wills the being of the beloved, Heidegger does so, furthermore, in terms that resonate strikingly also with those that *Being and Time* deploys to characterize my Being-toward-death. As he writes to Arendt in a letter dated May 13, 1925:

> Thank you for your letters—for how you have accepted me into your love—beloved. Do you know that this is the most difficult thing a human is given to endure? For anything else, there are methods, aids, limits, and understand-

36. Martin Heidegger, *Mindfulness*, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: Continuum, 2006), 52; *Besinnung* (Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997), 63.

37. The understanding and practice of philosophy as an erotic movement of love is one Heidegger evokes also in writing to his wife, letter of February 14, 1950. See Martin Heidegger, *Letters to His Wife: 1915–1970* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 213:

> The other thing, inseparable in a different way from my love for you & from my thinking, is difficult to say. I call it Eros, the oldest of the gods according to Parmenides. . . . The beat of that god's wings moves me every time I take a substantive step in my thinking and venture onto untrodden paths. It moves me perhaps more powerfully & uncannily than others when something long intuited is to be led across into the realm of the sayable & when what has been said must after all be left in solitude for a long time to come.

> ing [Für alles sonst gibt es Wege, Hilfe, Grenzen und Verstehen]—here alone everything means: to be *in* one's love = to be forced into one's ownmost existence [in der Liebe sein = in die eigenste Existenz gedrängt sein]. Amo means volo, ut sis, Augustine once said: I love you—I want that you be what you are [daß Du seiest, was Du bist].[38]

To be *in* one's love, we might interpret, keeping in mind the diligence that defines Dasein's basic state as Being-in, is to love not only the beloved but also, inextricably, the love itself, to care for it attentively and devotedly; and here Heidegger equates such Being-in with one's authentic or ownmost existence. And just as existence is always distinctively mine, so this gift of love, which Heidegger's letter counts the most difficult thing given a human to endure, is in each case unique. We can read Heidegger here to suggest what Nancy will later claim, that "all loves, so humbly alike, are superbly singular."[39] Heidegger repeats the point in a letter to Arendt two months later, where he states that "love *as such* does not exist ['Die' Liebe gibt es ja nicht]," for love means in any case (and in this case Arendt) "*your* love" (letter 23). As unique in each case, love resists the uniformity and the regularity, the repeatability and calculability of an "as such"; it thus resists and eludes pregiven method, aid, limit, and understanding; like living together, or dying so, as according to Derrida, or like philosophy itself as according already to Heidegger, it must be learned anew each time and in each moment; it thereby gives me in singular fashion to myself through a relation, which cannot be programmed, with the other for whom there can be no substitute.[40] Binding or holding me to the (mortal) beloved in her singularity, one irreducibly outside, whom I cannot manage or possess, love gives me thereby to my ownmost, and innermost, existence (which is thus never my own in the sense of a possession). My "authenticity" [Eigentlichkeit], which does not mean my "real" or "true" self (the one behind all the appearances) but rather my existence in its inescapable and nontransferable character, proves here to be not, indeed, a possession, and still less a self-possession, but a gift given *in and as relation* with another: my existence is most "my own" when I find it—which is to say when I receive it—*in* the love that gives me to myself in giving me over to one whom

38. Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, *Letters: 1925–1975*, ed. Ursula Ludz, trans. Andrew Shields (New York: Harcourt, 2004), 21; Arendt and Heidegger, *Briefe: 1925–1975* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2003), 31, letter 15; hereafter cited parenthetically by letter number.

39. Nancy, "Shattered Love," 99.

40. Nancy captures this beautifully in writing that "the heart does not belong to itself. . . . The heart of the singular being *is* that which is not totally his, but it is thus that it is *his heart*. . . . [A]nd all loves, so humbly alike, are superbly singular" ("Shattered Love," 99).

I never own or possess. Self and beloved are thus held, or hold each other, both together and apart, together *as* apart and apart *as* together, through a distance, or separated being, that is essential to love.[41] Such essential separation or distance remains at odds both with fusion (a commonly assumed ideal of love), which denies or eclipses separated being, and with possessive individualism or egoism, which ignores our constitutive being-with. Interpersonal love may thus name in its most intensified form the structure and movement of existence itself, founded, or found, in the diligence of being-in the world, and according to which I come to myself, or have a self, only in departing or standing out from myself, thus giving myself over to the world.

In this description of love as that which gives to me my ownmost existence, one should indeed hear resonate the analysis in *Being and Time* where it is not at first glance love but mortality that gives me my ownmost existence. Rather than attribute such resonance to some unexplained slippage between a personal letter written to a lover in 1925 and a philosophical magnum opus published in 1927, and rather than assume or assert that an emphasis on mortality means a forgetting of love, we should consider both the degree to which mortal existence is given most to itself in love (attuned *by* love to the mortality of self and beloved alike) and also the degree to which love is conditioned by mortal existence (taking condition in an etymological sense, such that love is spoken only along with mortality).

(2) This latter possibility—that the mortality of lover and beloved would condition their relation as lovers by marking their separated being—may never appear a possibility for those preoccupied along certain lines with the nonrelational character of Being-toward-death and with the "anticipatory resoluteness" associated therewith, which can seem to entail a kind of self-possession, and solipsism, at odds with what one assumes to be the relational logic of love. In what sense, however, (a) is Being-toward-death nonrelational, and what role (b) does that sense play in shaping relations of solicitude (and perhaps also, thus, of love)?

(a) Being-toward-death does not, and clearly cannot, mean that I am ever somehow Dasein in utter absolution or abstraction from my relations with other Dasein, or for that matter with other worldly beings not having the character of Dasein (and these too, I hold, are a condition of love, since love, as Being-with, always entails shared projects in living together, a point made clearly in *Being and Time* as well as much later, in 1965, in the Zollikon Seminars, where Heidegger reminds his interlocutors that my Being-with you "means a way of existing with you in the manner of Being-in-the-world, es-

41. Arendt's equation, then, of separation with egoism would appear misguided.

pecially a *Being-with* [Mitsein] one another in our relatedness [Bezogensein] to the things encountering us."[42]) Dasein is always, and irreducibly "with," other Dasein. (Heidegger reiterates just this point in refuting Binswanger's charge that *Being and Time*'s analysis of care somehow forgot—and therefore needs a supplementary analysis of—love. He there asserts clearly too that "care is never distinguishable from 'love.'"[43]) The relational structure of that "with" is ontological-existential; it is fundamental to the Being of any and every Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and it never starts with an isolated ego who first exists and then would face the difficulty of forming intersubjective relations, or of gaining access to the "alter ego," or of entering social-political forms of life (as if we were by nature free, equal, and independent individuals who only then face the question of entering social or political relations). The nonrelational character of Being-toward-death does not contradict or cancel such Being-with; it rather illuminates and even intensifies such Being-with by suspending it, much as anxiety highlights the significance of the world by rendering it insignificant, or much as boredom illuminates the character of possibility by rendering all possibilities for a time un-appealing and thus inoperative—none of which means that the world ever lacks significance, or that Dasein ever lacks the possibility of Being. Indeed, as the analysis of anxiety in *Being and Time* is meant to show, or as Heidegger puts the point succinctly in his 1925 *History of the Concept of Time*, "there is thus the possibility

42. Martin Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars: Protocols—Conversations—Letters*, ed. Medard Boss, trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 122; *Zollikoner Seminare* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), 145.

43. For the fuller context, which will deserve further study, see Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, 190; *Zollikoner Seminare*, 237: "Because care is merely conceived [by Binswanger] as a basic constitution of Da-sein, which has been isolated as a subject, and because it is seen as only an anthropological determination of Da-sein, care, with good reason, turns out to be a one-sided, melancholic interpretation of Dasein, which needs to be supplemented with 'love.' / But correctly understood (i.e., in a fundamental-ontological sense), care is never distinguishable from 'love' but is the name for the ecstatic-temporal constitution of the fundamental characteristic of Da-sein, that is, the understanding of being. / Love is founded on the understanding of being just as much as is *care* in the anthropological [psychological] sense. One can even expect that the essential determination of love, which looks for a guideline in the fundamental-ontological determination of Da-sein, will be deeper and more comprehensive than the one seeing love as something higher than care." See also Françoise Dastur's illuminating discussion of "phenomenology and therapy in the Zollikon seminars," which, relating the solicitude that leaps ahead in *Being and Time* to the definition of love as "letting be" in "Letter on Humanism," contends that "love is therefore nothing else than the liberating solicitude par excellence." See "Phénoménologie et thérapie dans les Zollikoner Seminare," in *Figures de la subjectivité: Approches phénoménologiques et psychiatriques*, ed. Jean-François Courtine (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1992), 173.

in the very moment of departing from the world, so to speak, when the world has nothing more to say to us and every other has nothing more to say, that the world and our being-in-it show themselves."[44] This illumination of our love relations, and their world-sustaining role, as well as the illumination of world's role in giving place and structure and time for love, were among the central stakes in our reading of McCarthy.

My Being-toward-death proves nonrelational in the sense that no other Dasein, nor my Being-with other Dasein, nor any other beings in the world, can ever take it over for me and thus disburden me of it (as in the movement of solicitude where we can—and do, necessarily and often quite fortunately—"leap in" for one another to deal with various of another's delimited concerns). "Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality for Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been *fully* assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to other Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one" (BT 294; SZ 250). Unless Heidegger simply contradicts what he has already said about Being-with as fundamental, the nonrelational character of my Being-toward-death would need to signal a possibility of existence from which no relation could remove me. This is exactly what Heidegger seems already to have explained just pages earlier in contending that death gives a limit to the kind of "representability [Vertretbarkeit]" (BT 283; SZ 239) that is "not only quite possible but . . . even constitutive for our being with one another" (BT 283–84; SZ 239–40). With respect to a certain range of concerns "one Dasein can and must, within certain limits, '*be*' another Dasein" (BT 284; SZ 240). With respect to its death, however, where Dasein's very possibility of Being is at stake (and hence its defining, fundamental, care by contrast to some determinate, relative concern), "*No one can take the Other's dying away from him.* Of course, someone can 'go to his death for another.' But that always means to sacrifice oneself for the Other '*in some definite affair.*' Such 'dying for' can never signify that the Other has thus had his death taken away in even the slightest degree" (BT 284; SZ 240).[45] If one doubts this nontransferable

44. Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 291; GA 20, 403.

45. See this same point in *History of the Concept of Time*, 310; GA 20, 428–29: "I can replace the other precisely in the everyday kind of being or concerned absorption in the world. In what then?—in what he does, in the world in which he is concerned and in this very concern. . . . In

character of death, perhaps one need only think of the dying beloved whose death one would in fact willingly, even eagerly, or desperately, take as one's own; what I learn in my desire to take on the beloved's death as my own is, simply and inevitably, that I cannot. Especially in my relation with the dying beloved, the nonrelational character of our Being-toward-death, the undeniable limit of our capacity to represent or stand in for one another, not only becomes acutely clear; it also, through that lucidity, highlights and intensifies the singular character, and thus the weight and meaning, of our relations with one another. That singularity of relation does not cancel but founds the possibility of authentic solicitude.

(b) Indeed, in this gap where Being-toward-death proves nontransferable, the possibility of authentic solicitude may be seen to open—the hence the possibility of a care-full love between my irreplaceable self and others who are likewise irreplaceable. This seems clearly among the stakes of Heidegger's analysis of anticipatory resoluteness—which, far from giving me over to myself in a solipsistic self-possession, pushes me authentically into the Being-with that always already conditions my existence in any case:

> Resoluteness, as *authentic Being-one's-Self,* does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I'. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is *authentically* nothing else than *Being-in-the-world*? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and *pushes it into solicitous Being with Others* [this last my emphasis].
>
> In the light of the "for-the-sake-of-which" of one's self-chosen potentiality-for-Being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude that leaps forth and liberates. . . . Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another. (BT 344; SZ 298)

this being of everyday absorption with one another in the world, we can in a certain way mutually replace one another, the one can within limits take over the Dasein of the other. But such a substitution always takes place only 'in' something, which means that it is oriented to a concern, to a specific what. / For all that, this possibility of replacing someone fails utterly when it comes to replacing the being of what constitutes the end of Dasein and thus gives it its wholeness in time. That is to say: *no one can relieve the other of his own dying.* It is true that he can die for another, but this is always for the sake of a definite cause, in the sense of concern for the being-in-the-world of the other. Dying for the other does not mean that the other has thus had his own death taken away, abolished. Every Dasein must take dying upon its very self, as Dasein. More precisely, *every Dasein, insofar as it is, has already taken this way of being upon itself. Death is in each instance and in its time my own death*; it belongs to me insofar as I am."

If a passage like this can seem to support the charge of critics that Heidegger construes Dasein's Being-with others starting only from the self who then moves toward others, one should read it against the background of Heidegger's clear assertion earlier in *Being and Time* that "the kind of Being which is closest to us" is "Being-in-the-world as Being-with" (BT 161; SZ 124), and indeed that "knowing oneself [Sichkennen] is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially" (BT 161; SZ 123–24); or one could read it again in light of the much later criticism, in the July 8, 1965, Zollikon seminar, that thinking about "I-Thou and We relationships" remains inadequate insofar as they "still have their origin in a primarily isolated Ego."[46] An even more pointed version of this take on things, two years after *Being and Time*, concludes *The Essence of Reasons (Vom Wesen des Grundes)*—while highlighting, moreover, the interplay of nearness and distance that informs our thinking of the heart in these pages:

> And so man, as existing transcendence abounding in and surpassing toward possibilities, is a *creature of distance.* Only through the primordial distances he establishes toward all being in his transcendence does a true nearness to things flourish in him. And only the knack for hearing into the distance awakens Dasein as self to the answer of its Dasein with others. For only in Dasein with others can Dasein surrender its individuality in order to win itself as an authentic self [Und nur das Hörenkönnen in die Ferne zeitigt dem Dasein als Selbst das Erwachen der Antwort des Mitdaseins, im Mitsein mit dem es die Ichheit darangeben kann, um sich als eigentliches Selbst zu gewinnen].[47]

One can see in *Being and Time*'s linkage between resoluteness and solicitude the connection Heidegger sees earlier, in Augustine, between "genuine self-care" and a "communal worldly" love that authentically wills the being of the beloved. Just as in the Augustinian context genuine self care (by contrast to worldly calculation—a precursor to *Being and Time*'s "falling") opens me to the authentic being of the beloved, so in *Being and Time*, resoluteness does not remove me from relations with others but awakens me to them in their singular character—by contrast to those relations that fall more fully under the sway of the they and its "irresoluteness,"[48] wherein any one Dasein can well substitute for another. Thus, "'resoluteness' signifies letting oneself be

46. Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, 111; *Zollikoner Seminare*, 145.

47. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons: A Bilingual Edition, Incorporating the German Text of Vom Wesen des Grundes*, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 131.

48. "Irresoluteness" is Heidegger's term for the phenomenon of "Being-surrendered to the way in which things have been prevalently interpreted by the 'they.' Dasein, as a they-self, gets 'lived' by the common-sense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon any-

summoned out of one's lostness in the 'they'" (BT 345; SZ 299), and only in being so summoned does one care, as oneself, for the other as herself.[49]

If in this passage concerning the relation of resoluteness to solicitude Heidegger deploys the Augustinian definition of love without using the name, he does speak explicitly of love while making the same linkage between authenticity and solicitude in a letter to Arendt dated June 22, 1925. Consistent with his thinking on resoluteness, that letter affirms, furthermore, love's essentially temporal character, and in such manner that love's joy must be open to possibility's danger—so that self and other alike are touched by that danger, and through a "faith" that is "shared." Understanding love as a "faith in the other" [Glaube an den Anderen] which alone can "accept the 'you' completely [vermag einzig das 'Du' wirklich zu nehmen]," Heidegger speaks of the great and growing joy that he feels *in her*: "When I say my joy in you [meine Freude an Dir] is great and growing, that means I also have faith in everything that is your story [dann heißt das, daß ich all das mitglaube, was Deine Geschichte ist]. I am not erecting an ideal," he continues, "—still less would I ever be tempted to educate you [Dich . . . zu erziehen], or anything resembling that. Rather, you—just as you are and will remain with your story—that's how I love you" (letter 20). *His* feeling, note, is in her, the beloved, his inwardness grounded outwardly in her, as something received relationally rather than possessed solipsistically. The joy that is relational to its core is bound with a shared faith in the happening of Arendt's story, her history [Geschichte]—which means, Heidegger makes clear, not a fixed ideal (or an idol) that he has erected and would have her conform to, but the singular story that remains distinctively hers, and that exposes beloved and lover alike, then, to the inevitable but unforeseen crises and struggles [Krisen und Kämpfe] to come. Not as an ideal, either already or still to be achieved or accomplished, but as the open temporality of story's happening (something fundamental, note, to Arendt's political conception of action in *The Human Condition*), the be-

thing but which has always made its decisions. 'Resoluteness' signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the 'they'" (BT 345; SZ 299).

49. It is important to note here that "resoluteness as authentic truth" does not remove me from the "untruth" of irresoluteness but rather "appropriates untruth authentically" (BT 345; SZ 299), just as authenticity is but an existentiell modification of inauthenticity. And for clarity on the question of solipsism, see Heidegger's insistence, in relation to anxiety, that "anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as '*solus ipse*.' But this existential 'solipsism' is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus to bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world" (BT 233; SZ 188).

loved is received and held and thus never possessed. "That's how I love you," he writes. "Only then is love strong for the future [stark auf die Zukunft], and not just a moment's fleeting pleasure—only then is the possibility of the other also moved and strengthened for the crises and struggles that never fail to arise [dann ist die Möglichkeit des Anderen mitergriffen und stark gegen Krisen und Kämpfen, die nicht ausbleiben]. But such faith is also kept from misusing the other's trust in love. Love that can be happy into the future has taken root [Liebe, die sich in die Zukunft hinein freuen kann, hat Wurzel geschlagen]" (letter 20).

By contrast to the Augustine for whom love's exposure to the temporal insecurity of a beloved would negate love's happiness, or enjoyment, Heidegger here suggests that my joy in another, and our love's happiness, are found only in and through the faith we share in the shared possibility of a story that remains always unfinished and ever exposed in its temporality to the insecurity, and thus the care, of crisis and struggle. One should note likewise the connection he suggests, in *Being and Time*, between joy and the mortal insecurity that gives us uniquely to ourselves: "Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility" (BT 358; SZ 310). Neither mortal insecurity nor authenticity would here compromise the logic of love and its joy. Dasein receives itself through love—and that reception is itself already a giving. As Heidegger writes to Arendt on June 22, 1925, "And that love *is*—that is its cheering bequest to Dasein, that it [i.e., Dasein] *can* be [Und daß die Liebe *ist*, das ist das beglückende Vermächtnis an das Dasein, daß es sein *kann*]." Dasein receives its existence—Heidegger says it—thanks to love, or through love, and this means that existence—in its authenticity—is not the function of possession but of our capacity for giving: "We have an effect," he writes, "only insofar as we are capable of *giving*. . . . And we have only as much right to exist as we are able to care about. For we can give only what we ask of ourselves [Wir wirken nur soweit, als wir zu *geben* vermögen. . . . Und wir haben nur soviel Recht zu sein, als wir es vermögen, achtzugeben. Denn wir selbst können nur geben, was wir von uns selbst uns abverlangen]" (letter 20). Our giving of self to the other, then, and our having the self in its ownmost, are not at odds, for to exist means already to be in love[50]; such love,

50. A striking expression of this same point appears in a letter Heidegger writes to his wife Elfride, dated August 23, 1920: "And what I give you—without talking much—in the way of real love is yours. And one becomes oneself strong in such love—a giving that is not a giving-away, in the very act of which one first finds oneself & returns to oneself from the sphere of constant distraction & estrangement" (Heidegger, *Letters to His Wife*, 77).

however, in its joy, is conditioned by its anxious, mortal exposure—wherein love, or the love that lets love be, sustains, and is sustained by, a world and time of memory and anticipation.

"And what can we do," Heidegger writes to Arendt in a letter dated May 8, 1925, "but only—open ourselves—and *allow* what is to be. Let it *be* so that it is pure joy to us and the wellspring of every new living day. / Elated about being who we are. And still one would like to 'say' something and to offer oneself to the other, but we could say only that the world is now no longer mine and yours—but *ours*—only that what we do and achieve belongs not to you *and* me but to *us*" (letter 14). Love, in other words, is the truth in its luminosity that the world is always already a with-world, and Being-in-the-world always already Being-with. Our places in the world are opened and sustained by that Being-with named love, even as our loves call for those places to welcome and hold them. Such interplay of love and place is essentially temporal, binding memory and promise; and so he can write from Marburg toward the end of winter semester 1928, "I am looking forward to the Black Forest, which has become even dearer to me since I learned you love it so" (letter 39). The lover's presence, both giving and given by worldly place and time, entails, as Heidegger emphasizes, the temporality of waiting and guarding. Love would not be the "great faith" it is, Heidegger says, "if waiting and guarding were not part of the experience of love [wenn ihr nicht gerade das aufbehalten bliebe, zu warten und zu behüten]" (letter 13). Like the Augustine whose world gave—and was given by—his love's recollective anticipation of the friend, so here Heidegger ties the waiting—and thus the guarding—of love to worldly place and time. But unlike the Augustine who believes he must indemnify love's happiness from the sorrow of our anxious mortal exposure, Heidegger here affirms that exposure as love's condition—as if accepting, while translating into the secular, Augustine's claim that when we love a place, we dwell there in the heart. The darkness of grief in Augustine—where he hates all familiar places because they can no longer answer love's anticipation with the possibility that "he will come"—illuminates a phenomenological truth that Augustine sees but does not quite accept: that our places of dwelling are given to us, our world—and the Being-in without which world is not—are given to us, through the love in which we anticipate, and are exposed to, the beloved; the capacity for such anticipation requires time, and such exposure cannot escape mortality. In recounting his grief, Augustine only makes clear the sorrowful condition of Heidegger's claim to Arendt that "being allowed to wait for the beloved—that is what is most wonderful—for it is in that waiting that the beloved is 'present' [Dieses Wartendürfen dem Geliebten zu—ist das Wundervollste—denn in ihm ist

das Geliebte gerade 'Gegenwart']" (letter 13). The presence of the beloved—always both anticipated and remembered, and each thanks to the other, each in and through the other—thus takes, even as it gives, time; and that time alone sustains, even as it is sustained by, our worldly places of living and dying. For the waiting, and the guarding, in which alone the beloved can be present are but the forward movement, joyful and anxious, of what is also already, sorrowfully but no less joyfully, remembrance. At the heart of our joyful anticipation pulses already the sorrowful memory, even as in sorrowful memory can live still a joyful anticipation: the joy all mourners know.