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# How A Revolutionary Counter-Mood Is Made

Jonathan Flatley

When we master a mood, we do so by way of  
a counter-mood; we are never free of moods.

—Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*

How to build a party, a black Bolshevik party?  
. . . We had studied the history of the Russian  
Bolsheviks and found a specific pamphlet by  
Lenin called “Where to Begin?”. . . where he  
described the role a newspaper could play.

—John Watson,  
“Black Editor: An Interview”

For Kathryne V. Lindberg

OVER THE YEARS, ONE OF THE SCENES that has sustained and propelled my interest in theories of affect is the one where variously depressed, stunned, and abused persons come together in solidarity as a newly energetic, hopeful, and demanding collective, which then engages in transformative political action. Quite happily, this past year has seen a series of such scenes: in Egypt, in the remarkable global spread of the Occupy movement, in the various protests challenging the Putin regime in Russia. How does it happen that a collective, deeply interested in, committed to, and capable of political action is formed where before there had been none? I will propose here that affect theory, and in particular the concept of mood in the sense of Martin Heidegger’s *Stimmung*, is essential for addressing this question.

For Heidegger, *Stimmung*, which might also be translated as attunement, is fundamental to our being-in-the-world; it is nothing less than the overall atmosphere or medium in which our thinking, doing, and acting occurs. Only within a mood or by way of mood can we encounter things in the world as mattering to us. In an important sense, a mood creates our world at a given moment. Thus, in some moods collective political action might not even enter one’s consciousness except as something impossible, futile, foolish, or obscure. But, then, with a shift in mood, organized political resistance all of a sudden seems obvious,

achievable, and vital, and it makes urgent and complete sense to storm the Winter Palace, to occupy Wall Street, or to strike. How do we get from one mood to another? Inasmuch as moods are a fundamental mode of being for Heidegger, we are never not in a mood. Our moods do, however, shift and change, and indeed Heidegger asserts that the only way we can “master” mood is by way of what he calls “counter-moods.”

I am interested here in the emergence of revolutionary counter-moods, those world-altering moments where new alliances, new enemies, and new fields of action become visible and urgently compelling. Despite his assertion of their importance, Heidegger did not offer many tools to help us see how counter-moods might be invoked or directed. My hypothesis is that one way to bring counter-moods into being is by way of what Daniel Stern calls an affective attunement, his term for the way that people share affective states with others. Although Stern’s emphasis is on attunement behaviors between parents and infants, his analysis has far-reaching implications for aesthetic and political experience more generally, and especially for our understanding of political organization, agitation, and propaganda.

Few thinkers rival Vladimir Lenin in his persistent searching for ways to bring revolutionary collectives into being. In his discussion of the transformative effects that a party newspaper can have in *What Is to Be Done?* Lenin offers a suggestive explanation of one way that revolutionary counter-moods might be made. He asserts that the most powerful agitational effects are achieved by straightforward reporting on the mistreatment of other persons, which, in his account, does not produce pity or sympathy but an immediate shift into a militant, collectively self-aware mood. Such reporting, I suggest, works by facilitating a mood-shifting affective attunement. This attunement then allows workers to share an affective state and indeed to become aware of themselves as a collective, and in so doing invoke a counter-mood, in which collective action—especially the strike—is newly attractive and compelling.

In order to ground these ideas in specific events, I examine one particular instance of collective political formation in which a party newspaper played a key role. In May of 1968, after a wildcat strike at the Dodge Main plant near Detroit, black workers came together to form the explicitly Marxist-Leninist Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (or DRUM), which quickly organized the factory, creating a model that was then adopted in other factories, which together formed the League of Revolutionary Black Workers. A central and highly effective aspect of their organizational approach, one inspired by a reading of Lenin by the group’s organizers, was the production of a modest, weekly factory newspaper or newsletter, also called *DRUM*, distributed by hand, that

mainly reported on the poor conditions at the plant and the often racist mistreatment of workers.

Although it is not my primary goal here, I hope that my analysis of counter-mood also helps to rebut Ruth Leys's recent claims that affect theory is invested in a complete separation of affect from aspects of cognition such as intention, belief, and ideas, such that the register of affect "lies beyond the influence of ideation or conceptuality," meaning that "intentions have no effect on actions." In her view, this renders "disagreement about meaning, or ideological dispute, irrelevant to cultural analysis."<sup>1</sup> It is true that affect theorists such as Silvan Tomkins, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Brian Massumi all emphasize the extent to which affective phenomena operate according to a logic that is not reducible to the logic of cognition, and this is my position as well. However, both Tomkins and Sedgwick, in particular, emphasize how affect and cognition are always in deep and complex interface with each other.<sup>2</sup> In this view, affects and moods may not be *directly* subject to intentions—I cannot, after all simply *decide* not to be depressed or anxious any more (I wish!)—but this does not mean that there is *no* way to exert agency in relation to our affects and affective experiences, only that such agency is mediated, variable, and situated. Of course, the organization of political groups and actions would be one instance where such agency is of paramount importance, and at least since Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, affect theorists have been concerned with the way that people's affects might be aroused and moods shifted in various politically charged situations.<sup>3</sup> DRUM (for whom ideological or political disagreements could not be more consequential) presents us with a striking example of the intentional, tactically and theoretically sophisticated exertion of agency over collective experiences of mood.

## Moods and Counter-Moods

"Mood," Heidegger writes in *Being and Time*, "has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself toward something."<sup>4</sup> Although our moods often escape notice, it is only through mood and by way of mood that we encounter the world, *as a whole*, in its totality, and it is only within moods that we can actually direct ourselves toward something, indeed toward anything. For *Dasein* (literally "being there," Heidegger's word for "a being," in the sense of a human being who necessarily finds itself in some "there"), everything about our being-in-the-world is filtered through and founded upon one's mood. Thus, mood establishes the conditions for our encounter with the world

before cognition and volition.<sup>5</sup> *Stimmung* is not, as Heidegger puts it in one of his lectures, “simply a consequence or side effect of our thinking, doing, and acting. It is—to put it crudely—the presupposition for such things, the ‘medium’ in which our thinking, doing, and acting occurs.”<sup>6</sup> The mood that we are “in” shapes the world in which we exist at a given moment. If every being always finds itself in a world, it may also be said that there is no “world” outside of mood.

For Heidegger mood is not a psychological concept; that is, moods are not something there “inside” us. “A mood assails us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside,’ but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being.”<sup>7</sup> He writes that mood is not “an inner condition which then in some mysterious way reaches out and leaves its mark on things and persons,” but is rather a basic element of being as such, which is fundamentally a “being-there-with.”<sup>8</sup> Just as being is for Heidegger necessarily also a “being-with” so too moods are also essentially plural.<sup>9</sup> If being is always a being-with-others, then we might say that mood is the “way” of this with, the form that our with-ness takes. Mood, Heidegger writes, “is not some being that appears in the soul as an experience, but is the way of our being there with one another” (*FCM* 66).

Mood is not “psychological” also in the sense that it is inherently connected to our particular, situated position in the world: “Being in a mood brings being to its ‘there.’”<sup>10</sup> For Heidegger, we always find ourselves not just in some generic world, but in a given and particular “there,” a there, moreover, in which we find ourselves as if “thrown.” We did not choose the world into which we have been born and in which we find ourselves. When Zora Neale Hurston writes “I feel most colored when I am thrown against a sharp white background,” for instance, she is registering just such a “thrownness,” and the way that one’s being is shaped at any given moment by the there into which one has been thrown.<sup>11</sup> Hurston here describes her thrownness in a very specific sense (with considerable insight into the logic of “race”) in that a “colored” racial identity depends on a white background against which this coloredness becomes apparent. But she is also describing the extent to which she has been born into a world in which “race” and racial identity matter, and in which whiteness is privileged, a privilege that functions in part by being normalized as an unmarked, presumed, unnoticed background. We are all thrust not just into specific historical contexts but also into a given position therein. Mood arises out of and discloses to us this situatedness. And if we attend to it, mood can help us to see the “thereness” of our “there,” the particularity of our position in a given situation, the givenness of that situation and the necessity of always finding ourselves in some there.<sup>12</sup> It can also help us to see the others with whom such

a mood and such a situation might be shared, the extent to which, as Jean-Luc Nancy writes, “being many-together is the originary situation; it is even what defines a ‘situation’ in general” (*BSP* 41).

Inasmuch as mood is a fundamental medium or presupposition through which we apprehend the world, it also allows certain affects, which are more punctual and more object-oriented than moods, to attach to certain objects, while at the same time foreclosing other attachments. As Heidegger puts it: “Nothing like an affect would come about . . . if Being-in-the-world, with its state of mind, had not already submitted itself [*sich schon angewiesen*] to having entities within-the-world ‘matter’ to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance.”<sup>13</sup> Thus, for instance, only if I am in a fearful (or fearless) mood can I encounter something as threatening. Whatever my mood—whether it is irritable, eager, nervous, optimistic, depressed, confident, bored, or militant—some certain persons, objects, and memories will come into my affective view, and others will not. Some people will appear as friends and others as enemies, and some tasks will seem possible and attractive while others will not even enter the field of consideration.

Inasmuch as we never find ourselves nowhere but always already find ourselves somewhere specific in a world with others, we are never not already attuned to certain things with a certain way of being with others.<sup>14</sup> Even though we often do not take note of our moods, and indeed it is those moods that we do not notice that are most powerful, to be in the world is to be in a mood.<sup>15</sup> Thus, we do not move from states of no mood to then being in a mood; we only shift from one mood to another, and indeed Heidegger insists that this is the only way that we can exert agency in relation to our moods. “When we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods.”<sup>16</sup>

However, as I noted above, Heidegger does not offer much by way of insight into how counter-moods come into being. He does suggest that such shifts can be brought about by the mundane act of someone walking into a room, someone who brings with her or him a way of being with others such that “irrespective of the sameness of *what* we do and *what* we engage *in*—the *way* in which we are together is different” (*FCM* 66). But what is it about some people, and the way they import a way of being together, that enables them to shift the mood of a room? What is it about some rooms that render them available for such shifts of mood? While Heidegger does not directly address these questions, he does write that an “understanding of the possibility of mood” is essential for the orator, which is why Aristotle discusses the affects (*pathe*) in *The Rhetoric*, a work Heidegger calls the “first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being-with-one-another.”<sup>17</sup> If there are always already

given moods that constitute a way of being together, then the successful speaker needs to be able to understand not only the possibility of moods in general, but also the specific mood and potential moods of a given group or audience in order to “arouse and direct” moods in the right way. To make moods, to arouse and direct them, one must also be an attuned reader of moods. As Fredric Jameson put it (in an essay on Lenin), like the psychoanalyst who “scans the rhythms of the enunciations in order to hear the desire at work in its pulsations,” the political leader “listens for the collective desire and crystallizes its presence in his political manifestos and ‘slogans.’”<sup>18</sup>

Few persons understood the possibilities of mood better or were more talented at scanning the rhythms and hearing the pulsations of particular moods, at attuning themselves to the situatedness of their audiences, than Lenin. In addition to making him a successful revolutionary leader, this makes his writings a rich archive of still-relevant lessons in the apprehending, arousing, and directing of moods, and on the centrality of affect to the work of political organization. It is in this vein that I want to turn to the passage from *What Is to Be Done?* already mentioned. I am proposing that implicit in Lenin’s description of the powerful and transformative effects of reading about the mistreatment of other persons is a well-nigh Heideggerian understanding of mood’s primary, disclosive nature as well as a working knowledge of the awakening of counter-moods.

In *What Is to Be Done?* Lenin presents the revolutionary party as a solution to the theoretical and tactical problem within Marx’s work concerning how a class-in-itself can become a class-for-itself. The problem is formulated most famously in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, where Marx lamented that while a class (in this case the small peasants) may be formed by groups of persons who live in similar conditions and share a set of economic interests (interests opposed to those of another group), these persons may nonetheless have no way of communicating among themselves and representing themselves to themselves, and may therefore have no awareness that their interests are shared by others, which makes it impossible for the class to defend those interests.<sup>19</sup> For Lenin, the way to move this “class-in-itself,” one that is not conscious of itself and is thus without political agency, to a “class-for-itself,” a self-conscious class capable of acting in its interest, was by way of the revolutionary party, where political professionals would do the work of representing the working class to itself from outside the space of economic struggle. And it is in this context that the newspaper takes on central importance, inasmuch as it can enable workers who may otherwise be alienated from other workers to see and feel the similarities of their situations and to

thereby not only become conscious of the class as a whole and of their position in it but also acquire a sense of emotional attachment to this collective.

In his analysis of the function of the party newspaper, Lenin begins with a basic, persistent problem of revolutionary organizing: Why do people tolerate being treated so poorly? Why don't they resist? He writes: "Why do the Russian workers still manifest little revolutionary activity in response to the brutal treatment of the people by the police, the persecution of religious sects, the flogging of peasants, the outrageous censorship, the torture of soldiers, the persecution of the most innocent cultural undertakings and so forth?"<sup>20</sup> That workers and peasants do not resist or protest is a failure on the part of the party, Lenin insists. He does not suggest talk of the bright future, or attempts to educate the workers with new concepts or theories, or even more correct analyses of the situation. Rather, Lenin argues for the importance of "political exposure." By exposure, Lenin means writing about the mistreatment of persons by the government, by the police, by factory owners, or by other persons in power. When we are able to "organize sufficiently wide, striking and rapid exposures" of what Lenin calls *gmnustnosti*, something that inspires a feeling of revulsion or disgust, Lenin writes, we can provoke a dramatic, nearly instantaneous effect:

When we do that, and we must and can do it, the most uneducated worker will understand, *or will feel*, that the students and religious sects, the peasant and the writer are being abused and outraged by those same dark forces that are oppressing and crushing him at every step of his life. And, when he does feel this, he will himself desire, with an irresistible desire, to respond—and he will know how to do it, today setting up a chorus of catcalls for the censor, tomorrow demonstrating outside the house of a governor who has brutally suppressed a peasant uprising, the day after tomorrow teaching a lesson to the priests who are nothing but policemen in cassocks doing the work of the Holy Inquisition, etc.<sup>21</sup>

Upon reading about the mistreatment of others, readers will not only understand, but will *feel* (Lenin's emphasis) that they are being oppressed by the same "dark forces" oppressing the persons they read about. Perhaps more surprisingly, Lenin asserts that the feeling will bring with it an irresistible desire to act as well as a knowledge of *how* to act, what to do. And this knowledge arises from the feeling, without reflection or theorization, as if it were already there, a kind of "unthought known" (to borrow from Christopher Bollas<sup>22</sup>). In this understanding, knowledge and the desire for action are not only things that reside or happen in our heads, but are things that happen to us by way of contact with others, as an essential part of our way of being-with-others.



The worker or peasant who reads about another's mistreatment and suddenly feels that he shares something with this other person finds her- or himself in a new *Stimmung*, one which has disclosed a different "there" and a different way of being-many-together, making friends and enemies visible in a way that they were not previously. Things matter in a new way, a way that is manifestly and consciously plural. A new "we" has come into being, one that enables, in its turn, a different "I" to be experienced and articulated. Actions which previously did not even enter the mind, targets which were previously invisible, now seem not only newly possible but nearly compulsory, objects of a desire now irresistible.

### Black Leninism

If Heidegger's understanding of *Stimmung* gives us a way to understand *what* has happened in the reading about the mistreatment of others in the party newspaper—the awakening of a counter-mood—one may still wonder *how* exactly this happens. In order to address this question, I will examine the role of the newspaper in the formation of the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement, paying particular attention to the kind of exposure Lenin described. First, however, a brief account of DRUM's formation and orientation may be helpful.

The key problem facing the group of black radicals who came to form DRUM was a familiar one in political organizing and indeed a well-known concern of *What Is to Be Done?*: how to turn the unorganized, spontaneously erupting oppositional energies of a class or group into an organized revolutionary movement.<sup>23</sup> The key event in the instance of DRUM was the insurrection in Detroit in the summer of 1967, which altered the mood and the political terrain in a number of ways. Most significantly, the power and potential of the collective participating in the insurrection was revealed by the extraordinary violence and state force required to quell it.<sup>24</sup> The insurrection also shut down the area factories for three days, and as Martin Glaberman put it, "The power of the black industrial working class was indicated, if indirectly, by the fact that the July days saw the shutdown of three giants of American capitalism: Ford, Chrysler and General Motors."<sup>25</sup>

Once the insurrection of the summer of 1967 had made it apparent that a potentially revolutionary collective existed, a group of black radicals, including John Watson, Luke Tripp, Kenneth Cockrel, Sr., General Baker, and Mike Hamlin, decided to begin to organize a revolutionary black communist party by founding a newspaper. Watson describes the importance of a reading of Lenin in making this decision.

Before the July insurrection we had an advanced community but no organization or leadership as advanced. Therefore, there was no organizational continuity . . . . How to build a party, a black Bolshevik party? How to organize black workers, coordinate the activities of black students. . . . As students of history we went back to see how people did these kinds of things. . . . We had studied the history of the Russian Bolsheviks and found a specific pamphlet by Lenin called "Where to Begin?," written in 1903, before he wrote "What Is To Be Done," where he described the role a newspaper could play. A newspaper was the focus of a permanent organization, it could provide a bridge between the peaks of activity. It creates an organization and organizes the division of labor among revolutionaries. . . . It was these tasks that we set out to perform through the creation of the *Inner City Voice*.<sup>26</sup>

Here, Watson draws attention to Lenin's emphases in "Where to Begin?"<sup>27</sup> on the way that the newspaper could focus and organize the revolutionary party itself, by creating a way of working, thinking, and being together. The weekly activity of the newspaper offered a bridge between peaks of activity and a way for party members to stay affectively focused on the political struggle, while at the same time publicizing a particular political position and the availability of a group politically and organizationally committed to that position.<sup>28</sup> Thus, when an opportunity for the organization of workers and political action arose, they would be ready to seize it.

And indeed, after the wildcat strike on May 2, 1968, the workers at Dodge Main could see in the *Inner City Voice* a representation of their interests and a model of political organization and action. Mike Hamlin writes about that moment that "we attracted to us a group of nine workers from the plant just by virtue of us producing a newspaper and projecting certain ideas. We had certain revolutionary ideas and a certain revolutionary line: that black workers would be the vanguard of the liberation struggle in this country."<sup>29</sup> This was the beginning of DRUM.<sup>30</sup>

The May 1968 wildcat strike was most immediately a response to the speed-up of the assembly line, although there was widespread dissatisfaction with a range of bad working conditions, including compulsory overtime and poor safety practices at the plant. Although black and white workers participated in this strike, black workers were singled out by management for punishment after the strike, with several being fired. The first issue of *DRUM*, whose headline is simply "Wildcat Strike," focuses precisely on the fact that "punishment was overwhelmingly applied to Black workers who were held responsible for the walk-out." This discriminatory response, echoing, as it did, a whole array of racist practices on the part of the management and the UAW alike, at a plant at which a large majority of the workers were African-American, would

be a key mobilizing force, motivating black workers to join DRUM in their fight against racism.<sup>31</sup>

One can see the influence of Lenin on DRUM and the League in their insistence on the need for a revolutionary party, on the value of professional revolutionaries for organizing workers and community members, and on the centrality of the newspaper to this organizational work.<sup>32</sup> Developing and extending C. L. R. James's proposition that the independent black struggle could have a pivotal role to play in the creation of a revolutionary situation,<sup>33</sup> they put a unique and tactically effective spin on the idea of the revolutionary party, arguing that black workers could and should be the vanguard of the worldwide struggle against capitalism. They focused on their strength at the point of production, noting that, as DRUM and League organizer Ken Cockrel wrote, "black workers find themselves located in the most dangerous, yet most productive and important jobs within the industrial network."<sup>34</sup> Therefore, they have the ability, by organizing themselves (and without need for alliances with white workers) "to completely close down the American economic system," as another DRUM and League organizer, John Watson, put it.<sup>35</sup> This was especially true at Dodge Main, the site of DRUM's formation, where a sizable majority of the ten thousand workers were African-American. Practically speaking, in addition to assembly line speed-up and poor working conditions, DRUM and the League seized on the key issue at the plants for black workers: the flagrant racism of management and union alike.

There is a lot to say about the history of DRUM and the League, especially regarding the dialectical twists and turns of their organizational and political development and eventual dissolution after a relatively short three years of official existence.<sup>36</sup> While there are a number of analyses of this history, and especially of why the League "failed," what I am interested in here is a moment of clear success: the organization of the factories using the factory newspapers.

## Reading and Affective Attunement

The genre of the exposure Lenin emphasized in "How to Begin," *What Is to Be Done?* and elsewhere was clearly central to DRUM's project, as even a quick examination of the publication and interviews with DRUM organizers reveals. As Mike Hamlin recounted: "We wrote about incidents, events and conditions of racism, brutality and other kinds of bad working conditions, which began to build a sense of resentment among the workers and began to develop a sense of unity among them. It was a

unity based on this resentment against these kinds of conditions, especially the racist practices in the plants.<sup>37</sup> Reading stories about incidents of mistreatment appeared to produce a feeling of shared resentment, which then produced a politically significant feeling of unity. Exactly what kind of reading experience, we might wonder, sets off this series of affective events?

At least two articles of the type that Hamlin mentions here ran under the title “Will You Be Next?” These stories recount instances of black workers being mistreated by white managers. The first of these stories, published in DRUM’s first issue (Figures 1 and 2), was subtitled “The Case of Willie Brookins, Jr.” It starts with a numbered list of nine facts about Brookins, beginning with his being “one of our black brothers,” and including his membership in the UAW, his being married with four children, his being fired, his never having been arrested, his being charged with felonious assault by a plant protection guard, and his being “another victim of union’s and management’s conspiracy to destroy all workers rights.” It concludes with the assertion that “Willie Brookins needs your help NOW.” After this list, we read a second title, “THE FACTS,” which is followed by a narrative recounting what happened to Brookins.

While the basic elements of the story are easy to grasp—Brookins was harassed and then provoked into a fight by white “Plant Protection” guards, a fight that was then used as a pretext for firing him—the story is rich in details that far exceed this general picture and that are, I think, the key to its impact. Here is how the narrative begins: “On the night of Thursday, September 7, 1967, Willie Brookins was on his way back into Hamtramck Assembly Plant through the over pass gate, after lunch break. He was carrying a paper bag containing two hot sausages purchased at a delicatessen on Jos. Campau. He opened the bag and displayed the contents of it to the security guard nearest him as he passed the guard house. A second guard ordered Willie to show him the contents of his bag, insinuating that there was a bomb in the sack. Willie ignored him and continued into the plant and boarded an elevator. The security guard who had accused Willie of having a bomb in his bag followed him into the plant and boarded the same elevator. They rode it to the third floor and both got off of the elevator. Willie proceeded to his work area and began to work checking stock on the line.” The text continues and describes how the guard calls the captain of the guards, who grabs Brookins, who then wrestles free, while “the other guard picked up Willie’s paper bag, emptied its contents (two hot sausages) on the floor and began stomping them.” Brookins picks up a pair of band cutters, and then puts them down, is assaulted again




Fig. 1. *DRUM* 1, no. 1 (1968). Courtesy of Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.



at which point he “flipped one of the guards over his back and by this time all the brothers on the line had stopped working and rallied to Willie’s support.” The “notorious” Hamtramck police are called and upon arrival are “greeted by a hail of washers, bolts and nuts and cat calls thrown at them by the workers on the line,” who also refused to work until the police and guards left. “As the policemen approached Willie they shouted ‘You prick, we will get you when you get outside.’” Willie is eventually fired, charges are filed against him, and at the time of the writing of the story, Chrysler is still pressing charges and has warned his union steward that he will also be charged if he pursues Brookins’s case through the union. The final paragraph asks readers to rally in support of Brookins: “Willie has been fired, framed, and systematically harassed by the Chrysler Corporation and our weak kneed, cowardly union ‘leadership.’ YOU MAY BE NEXT.”

While the story is framed by specific political rhetoric and general interpretations of the events (Brookins has been framed, the union and management are conspiring to destroy workers’ rights), the main narrative is fairly tightly focused on facts—specific behaviors, utterances, and the positions and movements of bodies—and is characterized by a neutral, almost evidentiary tone. That is, we would seem to have a mode of writing here that achieves its agitational and affective force not primarily through exhortation or emotional expressivity, but through description.<sup>38</sup>

This descriptive mode may be powerful, in part, because it removes the events in question from habitual modes of apprehension, allowing us to actually perceive and, in a sense, reexperience what has happened, instead of recognizing or knowing it. We might draw a rough analogy here to the descriptions of incidents “as if they were happening for the first time” that Shklovsky famously identified in Tolstoy as a paradigm of defamiliarization or “making strange” (*ostranenie*). (Tolstoy often used the device of a particular character’s viewpoint—as, in *Kholstomer*, a horse, or in *War and Peace*, a child—to introduce such a descriptive mode into the narrative.<sup>39</sup>) The point, for Shklovsky, is to take us out of automatic modes of perception in which something is *recognized* instead of seen, since those things perceived by habit, the things we already think we know, are scarcely perceived at all.

In “Will You Be Next?” the descriptive—one might say “factographic”—focus on a series of actions and behaviors similarly directs the reader away from immediately recognizing or knowing the events being depicted, allowing them to be perceived *as* events.<sup>40</sup> The reader is encouraged to stay close to the patterns of intensity, escalation, and punctuation that comprise the particular shape and rhythm of the event to be perceived.

It is these patterns and this rhythm, I think, that facilitate what Daniel Stern calls an “affective attunement.”

In *The Interpersonal World of the Infant*, Stern examines the ways that parents share affective states with infants, arguing that “the sharing of affective states is the most pervasive and clinically germane feature of intersubjective relatedness.”<sup>41</sup> The capacity for infant relationality depends upon the parent’s ability to engage in what Stern calls “affective attunement.” Interestingly, he finds that parents accomplish this attunement by performing “some behavior that is not a strict imitation but nonetheless corresponds in some way to the infant’s overt behavior” (*IWI* 139). So, for example, in one instance “the intensity level and duration of the girl’s voice is matched by the mother’s body movements.” In another case, “features of the boy’s arm movements are matched by features of the mother’s voice” (*IWI* 141). That is, the mother engages in an activity that is not identical to the infant’s, but similar to it, a similarity which is marked by way of a translation between modes or senses, from sound to movement, or vice versa, by way of “amodal” characteristics such as intensity, shape, or rhythm. In this way, Stern writes, “what is matched is not the other person’s behavior per se, but rather some aspect of the behavior that reflects the persons’ feeling state” (*IWI* 142).

Stern’s research also suggests that affective states or experiences are in some sense originally or fundamentally plural. One of the most surprising aspects of the interactions he observed was that while the infant took no apparent notice of attunement behaviors on the part of the mother, when the mother abruptly stopped these behaviors or failed to match the child’s intensity or rhythm, the infant interrupted its activities, often displaying confusion or uncertainty. Without the sharing of an affect, the infant suspends a behavior, unsure of how to continue, as if affects *require* a plural existence in order to come into being.

To return to the case of Willie Brookins then, a worker may perceive in the rhythm, shape, and intensity of the description an experience that is not identical to his or her own, but is similar in a way that conveys the feeling state behind the experience. One reads of the identification of the black man by a white man in a position of authority as a problem and a threat (he could have a bomb), a threat linked, if metaphorically (his concealed sausage), to the black man’s sexuality. Readers see the insistence on the availability of the black man’s person and belongings to inspection by any white guard who desires it, and the surveillance and gradually intensified aggression that leads to a physical attack. In the destruction of the sausages Brookins was saving for later, we also see the interruption of a planned meal, the loss of future nourishment. We also read of the spontaneous collective protest by the other workers. And, finally, we see the forceful application of institutional violence and



force, against which there seems to be little defense or assistance, even or especially by the legal and administrative structure whose supposed function is to provide such assistance. We might say that the abstract notion of “racism” is here evinced precisely in the shape and rhythm of the events, the “how” of the story as much as in its “what.” In so doing, the description produces in its readers the feeling of a differently positioned participation in the same ongoing event of racism at the plant. And that feeling, the feeling of affective attunement, is also the feeling of a counter-mood being awakened.

At such a moment, what might have previously seemed to be an experience “isolated from the interpersonal context of shareable experience” (*JWI* 151–52) is now not just shareable, but is itself the mechanism of sharing. It brings about not just a shift of moods, but a shift into another *kind* of mood. Heidegger remarks that bad moods are ones in which “Dasein becomes blind to itself,”<sup>42</sup> when we are shut off from an awareness of our thrownness and the “with-ness” of our being. Such bad moods are, of course, also ways of being with others, ones in which, as Jean-Luc Nancy writes, “not being able to say ‘we’ is what plunges every ‘I,’ whether individual or collective, into the insanity where he cannot say ‘I’ either” (*BSP* 152). But at moments of reading and affective attunement such as the hypothetical one just described, workers may find themselves awakened to another kind of mood in which the with-ness of their thrownness is revealed, and in which the basic plurality of being, the way that being-many-together is the basic situation, is newly apparent and available for understanding, tactical planning, and organization.

In such a mood, instead of feeling isolated or alienated by one’s racist treatment by the foreman, depressed about the injuries one has suffered and seen and about the inadequate treatment received by the doctors, exhausted by the backbreaking speed of work on the assembly line, and anxious about the dangers there, one feels that these feelings are shared with others, and, moreover, that there is strength in that sharing, that the others with whom one shares that experience exceed the number and force of the oppressors.

Further intensifying the experience of reading at this moment is the feeling of sharing an affective experience not only with the person being described, but also with all the other people reading. The reading experience brings one into contact with these other readers, whose reading-with may contribute to the transformative thrill or shudder that, in some accounts, characterizes one kind of “aesthetic feeling.”<sup>43</sup> Readers might find an image of this transference of feeling from the person one is reading about to the others one is reading with, and its transformative effect, in the description of the workers on the line who,

after witnessing the mistreatment of Willie Brookins, rally to his support, refuse to work, and greet the Hamtramck police with “a hail of washers, bolts and nuts and cat calls.” Sharing a feeling with Brookins and expressing solidarity with him becomes solidarity with the other workers, a solidarity that leads directly to action.

Of course, it should be emphasized, for *DRUM* to have been effective in the ways that it appears to have been, for the stories to have found readers who were ready to be affected, it was necessary for its stories to correspond to the moods, experiences, and situations of the workers. As John Watson remarked, it was essential in organizing the plant to have a “clear understanding of the needs of the workers and of the kinds of problems which they are facing in the plant.”<sup>44</sup> In order to direct the mood of its readers, *DRUM* as an organization needed to be skilled at apprehending and understanding its members’ mood.

In this task, it is significant that the authors of the articles were often workers as well, and that the issues of *DRUM*—the mimeographed, folded-over pieces of 8½” by 14” paper—were passed from hand to hand, from worker to worker. John Watson: “The publication is an organizing tool in and of itself in that the workers begin to write for the publication and distribute it in the plant. Through recruiting reporters and through distribution of the publication we develop a network of communication throughout the plant.”<sup>45</sup> A mode of circulation is established that works against a feeling of isolation and establishes a way of being-with that contrasts to the institutional logic of the plant and the union. Representing the experience of work is no longer something that is done for or to one, but *with* one; the work of representation and the representation of work are now held in common.<sup>46</sup> Communication and sharing, within this logic, require and produce a multiplicity of distinct but connected positions in a common affective space. As Nancy puts it: “In order to be together and to communicate, a correlation of places *and* a transition of passages from one place to another is necessary” (*BSP* 61). This is not the community in anonymity that Benedict Anderson describes as an achievement of the modern national newspaper, but a specific “we,” in which each member has a part and a position.<sup>47</sup>

Once the collective, revolutionary counter-mood has been awakened, the communication and sharing, placing and spacing achieved by the newspaper can be a central mechanism for directing, renewing, and revitalizing the mood. The newspaper was a central organizing and agitational tool, that is, not only in bringing together the leadership of the party (as Lenin had argued in “Where To Begin?”) and creating ties among the workers, but also in enabling workers to maintain and refresh their newly awakened mood and political commitment.

DRUM and the League seems to have understood that a revolutionary mood is essentially oriented toward transformative activity and as such requires a praxis that keeps a goal and project constantly in view. This is one way to understand the range of activities they initiated, which included, among other things, both union and local electoral politics, expanding the area of organization outside the factory into the community, and filmmaking.<sup>48</sup> One of DRUM's first actions, however, was the planning of another strike in July, 1968. And this strike was not a spontaneous reaction to a speed up on the assembly line, but an actualization of DRUM's power as a collective. It communicated to the world (not least to Chrysler and the UAW) and to the workers themselves that a collective capable of self-representation and planned actions now existed.<sup>49</sup>

In actualizing this new collective, the strike may also be a key step in the creation of a specifically communist *Stimmung*, a communist way of being-there-with-others. In the strike, power is not additive: it is not as if each worker individually possesses some power that is then added together to make a greater power. Rather, being many-together is constitutive of the strike's power; the strike simply does not come into being unless everyone, or nearly everyone, strikes in solidarity with one another. Thus, the strike promises to both direct and renew the mood—the way of being-with—brought into being by the *DRUM* newspaper, a mood opposed to Chrysler, the plant management, the union, and to the circulation of money that brings them all together. If, as Marx famously notes in the *Grundrisse*, “where money is not itself the community [*Gemeinwesen*], it must dissolve the community,”<sup>50</sup> then in the strike, as with the newspaper, DRUM is engaged in the invention of another form and way of being together, a mood that opposes the community of money. And as Antonio Negri notes, “when the proletariat takes it as her objective to re-appropriate the *Gemeinwesen*, the community, to turn it into the order of a new society” we see communism beginning to take shape.<sup>51</sup> Although this communism's future appears to have been forgotten, its mood still circulates.

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#### NOTES

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1 See Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” *Critical Inquiry* 36, no. 3 and “Affect and Intention: A Reply to William E. Connolly,” *Critical Inquiry* 37, no. 4 (2011). Quotes here from “Reply,” 803, 800, and “The Turn to Affect,” 472, respectively. See also her *From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz and After* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007), which also pursues an aggressive critique of affect theory, and of Sedgwick in particular, pages 123–56. For a more sustained critique of Leys’s argument in *From Guilt to Shame*, see J. Keith Vincent’s review in *Criticism: A Quarterly for Literature and The Arts* 54, no. 4 (forthcoming).

2 Relevant texts here would include Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, eds., *Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 1995); Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2003); Silvan Tomkins, “The Quest for Primary Motives: Biography and Autobiography of An Idea,” in *Exploring Affect: The Selected Writings of Silvan S. Tomkins* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), 27–63. In *Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2008), I offer a fuller account of Tomkins on affect; see especially 11–18.

3 Indeed I think that many of us working on affect are concerned to understand the specific, not-reducible-to-cognition logics of affects and affective experiences (even or especially negative or depressing ones) precisely in order to better understand how people can and do exert agency in relation to their affective lives. In addition to Eve Sedgwick, I am thinking of recent work by Lauren Berlant, particularly *Cruel Optimism* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2011), as well as Heather K. Love, *Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007), Ann Cvetkovich, *An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality and Lesbian Public Cultures* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2003), Ann Cvetkovich, *Depression: A Public Feeling* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2012), José Esteban Muñoz, *Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity* (New York: NYU Press, 2009), and José Esteban Muñoz, *Feeling Brown: Ethnicity, Affect and Performance* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, forthcoming), Sianne Ngai, *Ugly Feelings* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005), and Richard Grusin, *Premeditation: Affect and Mediality after 9/11* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).

4 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 129, italics Heidegger’s. In what follows, I rely on both the newer Stambaugh translation and *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) (hereafter cited as *BT*). In the German edition (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1979), pages of which are referenced in both English translations, the primary discussion of *Stimmung* is on pages 134–40. See also Charles Guignon, “Moods in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*,” in *What Is An Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology*, ed. Chesire Calhoun and Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1984), 230–43, Michel Haar, “The Primacy of *Stimmung* over Dasein’s Bodiliness,” in *The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being*, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993), 34–46; Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s *Being and Time, Division I** (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), esp. 168–83; Sianne Ngai, *Ugly Feelings*, especially Chapter 5, “Anxiety,” 209–47; Gianni Vattimo, *Art’s Claim to Truth* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2008), 57–73; and Jonathan Flatley, *Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Poetics of Modernism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2008), esp. 19–24, 109–113.

5 “[O]ntologically mood [*Stimmung*] is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself *prior* to all cognition and volition and *beyond* their range of disclosure.” Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, 175.

6 Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1995) (hereafter cited as *FCM* 68).

- 7 *BT*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, 176.
- 8 *BT*, trans. Stambaugh, 129.
- 9 Jean Luc-Nancy's *Being Singular Plural* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000) (hereafter cited as *BSP*) offers an excellent exposition of the fundamental with-ness of being in Heidegger's thought.
- 10 *BT*, trans. Stambaugh, 127.
- 11 Zora Neale Hurston, "How It Feels To Be Colored Me," in *I Love Myself When I Am Laughing . . . and then Again When I Am Looking Mean And Impressive: A Zora Neale Hurston Reader*, ed. Alice Walker (New York: The Feminist Press at the CUNY, 1979), 154. See also Glenn Ligon's brilliant appropriation of this citation from Hurston in his work *Untitled (I Feel Most Colored When I Am Thrown Against a Sharp White Background)*, ed. Scott Rothkopf (New York: Whitney Museum of American Art, 2011), 98.
- 12 "This characteristic of Dasein's Being—this 'that it is'—is veiled in its 'whence' and 'whither,' yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the 'thrownness' [*Geworfenheit*] of this entity into its 'there'. . . . The expression 'thrownness' is meant to suggest the *facticity of its being delivered over*." *BT*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, 174.
- 13 *BT*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, 177.
- 14 "It seems as though an attunement is in each case already there, so to speak, like an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through" (*FCM* 67).
- 15 Here we can begin to see the parallel with the concept of ideology. "Precisely *those* attunements to which we pay no heed at all, the attunements we least observe, those attunements which attune us in such a way that we feel as though there is no attunement there at all, as though we were not attuned in any at all—those attunements are the most powerful" (*FCM* 68).
- 16 *BT*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, 175.
- 17 The full passage from which I am borrowing and that I am, in part, glossing here, reads: "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* must be understood as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being-with-one-another. Publicness as the kind of being of the they . . . not only has its attunedness, it uses mood and 'makes' it for itself. The speaker speaks to it and from it. He needs the understanding of the possibility of mood in order to arouse and direct it in the right way" (*BT*, trans. Stambaugh, 130).
- 18 Sebastian Budgen, Stathis Kouvelakis, and Slavoj Žižek, eds., "Lenin and Revisionism," in *Lenin Reloaded: Toward a Politics of Truth*, (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2007), 59–73, 71.
- 19 Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 123–24. The famous passage reads, in part: "The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. . . . In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interest begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented."
- 20 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement*, in *The Lenin Anthology*, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: Norton, 1975), 43.
- 21 Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?* 43.

22 See Christopher Bollas, *The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1987).

23 See Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?* especially 27–31. Of course the literature on Lenin is immense, but concerning debates about spontaneity in Lenin, see Lars T. Lih, *Lenin Rediscovered: What Is To Be Done? in Context* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008).

24 The insurrection was one of the largest of the urban uprisings of the late 1960s, and, as is well known, not only the National Guard but also Army troops from the 82<sup>nd</sup> and 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne were eventually sent in to restore government control of the city. On the insurrection see Sidney Fine, *Violence in the Model City: The Cavanagh Administration, Race Relations, and the Detroit Riot of 1967* (East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. Press, 2007), originally published 1989.

25 Martin Glaberman, *Survey: Detroit, International Socialism* (April/May 1969): 9.

26 “Black Editor: An Interview with John Watson,” in “Historical Roots of Black Liberation,” special issue, *Radical America* 2, no. 4 (July, August 1968): 31.

27 “Where to Begin?” [*S Chego Nachat?*] was first published in *Iskra* [The Spark] in 1901. See *V. I. Lenin Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1961), 5:13–24. The short essay was widely available in English translation in various pamphlets on agitation, organization, and newspapers published by the Soviet Union’s Foreign Languages Publishing House.

28 Of course, the function of the revolutionary party newspaper is a huge topic in itself, as it has been practically a matter of revolutionary common sense that the production and distribution of a newspaper must be central to the creation of a revolutionary class and a revolutionary situation. See Régis Debray, “Socialism: A Life-cycle,” *New Left Review* 46 (July–August 2007): 5–28, for a case for the essential, intimate relationship between socialism and the print medium more generally.

29 Jim Jacobs and David Wellman, “An interview with Ken Cockrel and Mike Hamlin of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers,” in ‘*Our Thing is DRUM!*’ (Detroit: Black Star Press, n.d.) 11–38, pamphlet reprinted from *Leviathan* 2, no. 2 (June 1970): 11.

30 For historical accounts of the origins of DRUM and the League, see: Muhammad Ahmad, *We Will Return in the Whirlwind: Black Radical Organizations 1960–1975* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 2007), 237–86; James A. Geschwender, *Class, Race, and Worker Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary Black Workers* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977); Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin, *Detroit: I Do Mind Dying: A Study in Urban Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: South End, 1998); and Heather Ann Thompson, *Whose Detroit?: Politics, Labor, Race in a Modern American City* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2001), especially 71–127. For the political and ideological positions of DRUM and the League, see first the writings by League members, especially Jacobs and Wellman, “An interview with Ken V. Cockrel and Mike Hamlin,” ‘*Our Thing is DRUM!*’, “Black Editor: An Interview with John Watson,” in “Historical Roots of Black Liberation,” special issue, *Radical America* 2, no. 4 (July, August 1968); Kenneth V. Cockrel, “From Repression to Revolution,” *Radical America* 5, no. 2 (March–April 1971): 81–89. See also Mike Hamlin and General Baker interviews in *Detroit Lives*, ed. Robert H. Mast (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1994), 85–88, 305–13, and Chuck Wooten, “Why I Joined DRUM,” in *Black Workers in Revolt: How Detroit’s New Black Revolutionary Workers Are Changing the Face of American Trade Unionism*, ed. Robert Dudnick, (Detroit: Radical Education Project, n.d.). Articles originally published in February 15, 1969, and March 18, 1969, issues of *The Guardian*, independent radical newsweekly.

31 In his “Open Letter to Chrysler Corporation,” published in *Inner City Voice* in July 1968, General Baker thanked Chrysler for firing him, because this act “lit the unquenchable spark.”

32 On this, see John Watson: “The production of the publications, the publication of the various documents which are needed, for instance, the constitution of the group, demand organization skills which don’t exist among the workers. . . . It is also essential to

understand that the cats working in an automobile plant killing themselves for ten hours a day, working six and sometimes seven days a week, are generally too tired to do all the work which is necessary to tie together membership meetings, produce publications, get in contact with community groups for support, raise funds and so on and so forth. Therefore, it is necessary to have some group of supporters outside the factory who can carry out all of these service to the workers." John Watson, "To the Point of Production—An Interview with John Watson of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers," *The Movement*, July 1969, 5.

33 C. L. R. James, "The Revolutionary Answer to the Negro Problem in the USA," in *C. L. R. James on the "Negro Question,"* ed. Scott McLemee (Jackson: Univ. of Mississippi Press, 1996), 138–47.

34 Kenneth Cockrel, "History and Derivation of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers," unpublished manuscript, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University (Cockrel collection), 25.

35 Watson, "To the Point of Production," 6.

36 After their quick success in organizing a series of factories, the League gradually got involved in a whole range of other activities, including education, community organizing, legal defenses, electoral politics, and filmmaking. For the 1968 and 1969 academic year John Watson was elected to be the editor of the Wayne State newspaper, *The South End*, and he basically turned it into a League organ. The League ran one of their members, Ron March, for election to the UAW board of trustees, but he lost in a possibly corrupt election. In collaboration with members of the Detroit Newsreel film collective, the League made a film, called *Finally Got the News*, which highlights the centrality of the newspaper to the League's activities, and attempts to translate that function into the medium of film. For an account of the making of *Finally Got the News*, see Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin, *Detroit: I Do Mind Dying* (Cambridge, MA: South End, 1999), esp. 113–23. For a consideration of the League's achievements (which he calls "the single most significant political experience of the 1960s"), and of *Finally Got the News*, see Fredric Jameson, "Cognitive Mapping," in *Marxism and The Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Lawrence Grossberg and Cary Nelson (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1988), reprinted in *The Jameson Reader*, ed. Michael Hardt and Kathi Weeks (New York: Blackwell, 2000), 277–87; and Fred Moten's response to Jameson and reading of the film in *In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2003), 211–31.

37 Jacobs and Wellman, "An Interview with Ken Cockrel and Mike Hamlin," 11.

38 For a related take on description that influenced my thinking here, see Heather Love's "Close but Not Deep: Literary Ethics and the Descriptive Turn," *New Literary History* 41, no. 2 (2010): 371–91. There, Love considers the "flat and thin" writing that characterizes not only Erving Goffman's sociological descriptions but also, and more surprisingly, key moments in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*. Such descriptions, Love shows, eschew the attempt to give interpretive depth and richness to human behavior in exchange for an emphasis on the "real variety that is already there" (377) and in so doing evince the possibility of an ethics "grounded in documentation and description" (375).

39 In a famous description of the opera in *War and Peace* (seen from a child's point of view), for instance, Tolstoy leaves out the opera's narrative and generic codes, describing the performance as a series of behaviors, movements, and audience responses. See Victor Shklovsky, "Art As Technique," in *Theory of Prose*, trans. Benjamin Sher (Elmwood Park, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990), 8.

40 I borrow the neologism "factography" from the early Soviet context, where it was developed in the second half of the 1920s to describe a range of practices involved in the inscription of facts. See the essays and translations in "Soviet Factography: A Special Issue," ed. Devin Fore, *OCTOBER* 118 (Fall 2006), and also Yury Tynyanov, "The Literary

Fact" (1924), in *Modern Genre Theory*, ed. David Duff, trans. Ann Shukman (Harlow, UK: Longman, 2000), 29–49; Benjamin Buchloh, "From Faktura to Factography," *OCTOBER* 30 (Fall 1984): 82–119; Kristin Romberg, "Alekssei Gan's Constructivism, 1917–1928" (doctoral dissertation, Columbia Univ., 2010), especially chapters 4 and 5; and Sarah Ruddy, "This Fact Which Is Not One: Differential Poetics in Transatlantic American Modernism" (doctoral dissertation, Wayne State Univ., 2012).

41 Daniel Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 138 (hereafter cited as *IWI*).

42 *BT*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, 175.

43 See, for instance, Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1997): "The shudder in which subjectivity stirs without yet being subjectivity is the act of being touched by the other. Aesthetic comportment assimilates itself to that other rather than subordinating it" (331).

44 Watson, "To The Point of Production," 4–5.

45 Watson, "To The Point of Production," 5.

46 On the representation of work in newspapers see Walter Benjamin, "The Newspaper," in *Selected Writings, 1927–1934* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press), 2:721–22, and Devin Fore, "The Operative Word in Soviet Factography," in "Soviet Factography: A Special Issue," esp. 123–31.

47 In his well-known argument, Anderson described the central role daily newspapers played in the production of a feeling of nationness and the creation of the modern nation state. Briefly, he argues that the public for the newspaper allows its readers to feel, as they are reading, that in reading the morning paper, thousands or millions of others are doing the same thing at the same time, others "in whose existence he is confident, but whose identity is unknown." This sense of "community in anonymity" helps to produce the sense of "deep horizontal comradeship," that Anderson sees as the basic element of nationness. Also, in their collecting a whole range of discontinuous information from around the world under a single date and in a single language, a date that repeats every day in the same way ad infinitum, newspapers create the sense of a homogeneous, progressive time necessary for the creation of a sense of "steady, simultaneous, anonymous activity." See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983), 31.

48 See note 36, above.

49 There is not space here for a proper consideration of this strike and its organization as an instance of the direction of mood toward a particular action. In another essay on the direction, renewal, and refreshment of revolutionary mood (part of my current book project, *Black Leninism*), I examine the handbill that announced this strike to the workers entering the factory, and analyze *Finally Got the News* as an attempt to translate the agitational and propagandistic function of the factory newspaper into film.

50 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 224.

51 Antonio Negri, "Communism: Some Thoughts on the Concept and Practice." [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp\\_negri21.htm](http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm). A lecture given at Birkbeck in 2009, accessed June 12, 2012.