Keynote Presentations
Tuesday, April 16
Robertson Gymnasium 1000A, 4 pm
The Idea of the Theological Virtues
Daniel Watts, University of Essex
The doctrine of the theological virtues holds that faith, hope and love are virtues of a special kind. Being divine gifts, and directed towards our supernatural telos, these virtues differ in kind from those on the classical lists, not least the ones Aquinas called ‘cardinal’. This doctrine gives rise to a dilemma. Either the theological virtues are capable of being cultivated through human agency, in which case they do not in this respect differ in kind from those on the classical lists – or they are incapable of being cultivated through human agency, in which case they are not really human virtues. In this paper, I chart possible responses to this dilemma and advance what I call a non-theological solution to the problem it articulates. Developing Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of ‘virtues of acknowledged dependence’, I argue that there is a cogent way of thinking of faith, hope and love as virtues of a kind, without recourse to Aquinas’ views about human teleology or to any special theory of divine agency. On the approach I develop, faith, hope and love are virtues of a kind because of the way in which they express the distinctive stance involved in owning up to our human dependence and vulnerability. My overall aim is to show that ethicists still have much to learn from the idea of the theological virtues, even if they do not accept the Thomistic framework in which this idea is traditionally advanced.
Wednesday, April 17
Robertson Gymnasium 1000A, 10 am
Love’s Telos: Kierkegaard’s Critique of Preferential Love
Daniel Watts, University of Essex
Kierkegaard’s Works of Love is often associated with a harshly dismissive stance toward ordinary human love, as measured against an ascetic ideal of pure, Christian, non-preferential love. Despite a number of recent attempts to give it a sympathetic hearing, the worry persists that this text denigrates most what we ordinarily call love in ways that are extreme and implausible. My own view is that, on a standard, moralizing reading of Works of Love, this sort of complaint cannot be adequately answered. However, I believe that the moralizing reading misconstrues the overall structure of Kierkegaard’s critique and misses its internal character. My main aim in this paper is therefore to clarify the structure of Kierkegaard’s argument and to develop an alternative interpretative framework. While I shall not try here to offer a full defense of the standpoint of Works of Love, I do hope to indicate why stock criticisms miss their target and how this text offers a cogent overall contribution to the philosophy of love.
Presentations by Humanities & Social Change Postdoctoral Fellows
Wednesday, April 17
Robertson Gymnasium 1000A, 2-5 pm
The Problem of Inherited Guilt in Kierkegaard’s Either/Or
Simon Thornton
Autonomy, Authenticity, and Alterity
Martijn Buijs
Thursday, April 18
Robertson Gymnasium 1000A, 9-12 pm
A Leftist Turns from Marxism to the Poem: On the Soul’s Relationship to Form
Saleem Al-Bahloly
The Lament in Songs and Narratives of Slavery in the Romantic Archive
Catherene Ngoh
Some Concluding Reflections on Powerlessness
Thursday, April 18
Robertson Gymnasium 1000A, 2-5 pm
Watchfulness as a Virtue: Christian and Secular Perspectives
Daniel Watts, University of Essex
Daniel Watts is Senior Lecturer in the School of Philosophy and Art History at the University of Essex, and co-investigator on “The Ethics of Powerlessness” project. His work focuses on Søren Kierkegaard, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the phenomenological tradition. Author of numerous articles on Kierkegaard, he is currently working on a book titled, Thinking Humanly: Kierkegaard on Subjectivity and Thought.